

# Faster Pwning Assured: New Adventures with FPGAs


DEFCON 2007

David Hulton <[david@toorcon.org](mailto:david@toorcon.org)>

Chairman, ToorCon

Security R&D, Pico Computing, Inc.


Researcher, The OpenCiphers Project




# Overview


- FPGAs – Quick Intro
- New Cracking Tools! (Since ShmooCon)
  - BTCrack – Bluetooth Authentication
  - WinZipCrack – WinZip AES Encryption
- New to 2007! (Since Last Defcon)
  - VileFault – Mac OS-X FileVault
  - jc-aircrack – WEP (FMS)
  - Works in Progress
- Conclusions

# FPGAs




# FPGAs






# FPGAs


- Quick Intro
  - Chip with a ton of general purpose logic
    - ANDs, ORs, XORs
    - FlipFlops (Registers)
    - BlockRAM (Cache)
    - DSP48's (ALUs)
    - DCMs (Clock Multipliers)



# FPGAs


- **Virtex-4 LX25**






# FPGAs


- Virtex-4 LX25
  - IOBs (448)






# FPGAs

- Virtex-4 LX25
  - IOBs
  - Slices (10,752)









# FPGAs


- Virtex-4 LX25
  - IOBs
  - Slices
  - DCMs (8)






# FPGAs


- Virtex-4 LX25
  - IOBs
  - Slices
  - DCMs
  - **BlockRAMs (72)**






# FPGAs


- Virtex-4 LX25
  - IOBs
  - Slices
  - DCMs
  - BlockRAMs
  - **DSP48s (48)**






# FPGAs


- Virtex-4 LX25
  - IOBs
  - Slices
  - DCMs
  - BlockRAMs
  - DSP48s
  - Programmable Routing Matrix (~18 layers)





# Bluetooth PIN Cracking

- Pairing bluetooth devices is similar to wifi authentication
- Why not crack the bluetooth PIN?
- Uses a modified version of SAFER+
- SAFER+ inherently runs much faster in hardware
- Attack originally explained and published by Yaniv Shaked and Avishai Wool
- Thierry Zoller originally demonstrated his implementation at [hack.lu](http://hack.lu)




# Bluetooth PIN Cracking

- How it works
  - Capture a bluetooth authentication (sorry, requires an expensive protocol analyzer)
  - This is what you'll see

Master

Slave

in\_rand




master sends a random nonce

m\_comb\_key




m\_au\_rand



s\_comb\_key

sides create key based on the pin




master sends random number



s\_res


slave hashes with E1 and replies

m\_sres




s\_au\_rand

slave sends random number




master hashes with E1 and replies



# Bluetooth PIN Cracking


- Just try a PIN and if the hashes match the capture, it is correct
- Extremely small keyspace since most devices just use numeric PINs ( $10^{16}$ )
- My implementation is command line and should work on all systems with or without FPGA(s)



# Bluetooth PIN Cracking

- **FPGA Implementation**
  - Requires implementations of E21, E22, and E1 which all rely on SAFER+
  - Uses 16-stage pipeline version of SAFER+ which feeds back into itself after each stage
  - To explain, here's some psuedocode





# Bluetooth PIN Cracking


```
for(pin = 0; ; pin++) {
    Kinit = E22(pin, s_bd_addr, in_rand);           // determine initialization key

    m_comb_key ^= Kinit;                          // decrypt comb_keys
    s_comb_key ^= Kinit;

    m_lk = E21(m_comb_key, m_bd_addr);           // determine link key
    s_lk = E21(s_comb_key, s_bd_addr);
    lk = m_lk ^ s_lk;


    m_sres_t = E1(lk, s_au_rand, m_bd_addr);     // verify authentication
    s_sres_t = E1(lk, m_au_rand, s_bd_addr);

    if(m_sres_t == m_sres && s_sres_t == s_sres)
        found!
}
```





# Bluetooth PIN Cracking

```
for(pin = 0; ; pin++) {  
    Kinit = E22(pin, s_bd_addr, in_rand);           // determine initialization key  
  
    m_comb_key ^= Kinit;                          // decrypt comb_keys  
    s_comb_key ^= Kinit;  
  
    m_lk = E21(m_comb_key, m_bd_addr);            // determine link key  
    s_lk = E21(s_comb_key, s_bd_addr);  
    lk = m_lk ^ s_lk;  
  
    m_sres_t = E1(lk, s_au_rand, m_bd_addr);      // verify authentication  
    s_sres_t = E1(lk, m_au_rand, s_bd_addr);  
  
    if(m_sres_t == m_sres && s_sres_t == s_sres)  
        found!  
}
```




# Bluetooth PIN Cracking







# Bluetooth PIN Cracking




Output loops back and SAFER+ now does  
E21 for the Master



# Bluetooth PIN Cracking




Then does the second E21 for the Slave  
and combines the keys to create the link key




# Bluetooth PIN Cracking

PIN Gen



Then the first part of E1 for the Slave




# Bluetooth PIN Cracking


PIN Gen

E1


16 clock cycles later



Then the second part of E1 for the Slave




# Bluetooth PIN Cracking




Then the first part of E1 for the Master







# Bluetooth PIN Cracking




Then the second part of E1 for the Master



# Bluetooth PIN Cracking




Then checks all of the sres values to see if any match while the process starts over



# Bluetooth PIN Cracking

- If the cracker stops the computer reads back the last generated PIN from the pin generator to determine what the valid PIN was
- The last generated PIN – 16 should be the cracked PIN
- I built a commandline version
- Thierry Zoller integrated support into BTCrack
- I added some hollywood FX !



# Performance Comparison

## PC

btpinCrack

3.6GHz P4      ~40,000/sec

BTCrack

3.6GHz P4      ~100,000/sec

0.24 secs to crack 4 digit  
42 min to crack 8 digit


## FPGA

btpinCrack

LX25              ~7,000,000/sec  
15 Cluster       ~105,000,000/sec  
LX50              ~10,000,000/sec


0.001 secs to crack 4 digit  
10 secs to crack 8 digit

Demo




# WinZip AES Encryption

- Somewhat proprietary standard
- No open source code available (until now!)
- Format
  - Uses the standard ZIP format
  - Adds a new compression type (99)
  - Uses PBKDF2 (1000 iterations) for key derivation
  - Individual files can be encrypted inside the ZIP file
  - Supports 128/192/256-bit key lengths
  - Uses a 16-bit verification value to verify passwords
  - Otherwise you verify by using the checksum
  - Uses a salt (sorry, can't do a dictionary attack!)



# WinZip AES Encryption


- Cracking algorithm
  - Scan through ZIP file until you find the encrypted file
  - Get the 16-bit password verification value
  - Hash a password with PBKDF2 and see if the verification value matches
    - No – Try next password
    - Yes – Decrypt file and see if checksum matches
      - No – Try next password
      - Yes – Password found!



# WinZip AES Encryption

- Uses the same PBKDF2 core as the WPA and FileVault cracking code
- Requires extra iterations for longer key lengths
- Tool takes a ZIP file, encrypted file name, and dictionary file as input





# Performance Comparison

## PC

### winzipcrack

800MHz P3 ~100/sec

3.6GHz P4 ~180/sec

AMD Opteron ~200/sec

2.16GHz IntelDuo ~200/sec

## FPGA


### winzipcrack

LX25 ~2,000/sec

LX50 ~6,000/sec

15 Cluster ~30,000/sec


Demo



# VileFault


- “FileVault secures your home directory by encrypting its entire contents using the Advanced Encryption Standard with 128-bit keys. This high-performance algorithm automatically encrypts and decrypts in real time, so you don’t even know it’s happening.”






# VileFault

- We wanted to know what was happening




# VileFault

- Stores the home directory in a DMG file
- DMG is mounted when you login
- hdi framework handles everything
- Blocks get encrypted in 4kByte “chunks” AES-128, CBC mode
- Keys are encrypted (“wrapped”) in header of disk image
- Wrapping of keys done using 3DES-EDE
- Two different header formats (v1, v2)
- Version 2 header: support for asymmetrically (RSA) encrypted header




# VileFault

- Apple's FileVault
- Uses PBKDF2 for the password hashing
- Modified version of the WPA attack can be used to attack FileVault
- Just modified the WPA core to 1000 iterations instead of 4096
- Worked with Jacob Appelbaum & Ralf-Philip Weinmann to reverse engineer the FileVault format and encryption



# VileFault


- Login password used to derive key for unwrapping
  - PBKDF2 (PKCS#5 v2.0), 1000 iterations
- Crypto parts implemented in CDSA/CSSM
  - DiskImages has own AES implementation, pulls in SHA-1 from OpenSSL dylib
- “Apple custom” key wrapping loosely according to RFC 2630 in Apple's CDSA provider (open source)



# VileFault


- **vfdecrypt** (Ralf Philip-Weinmann & Jacob Appelbaum)
  - Will use the same method with a correct password to decrypt the DMG file and output an unencrypted DMG file
  - Result can be mounted on any system without a password
- **vfcrack** (me!)
  - Unwrap the header
  - Use header to run PBKDF2 with possible passphrases
  - Use PBKDF2 hash to try and decrypt the AES key, if it doesn't work, try next passphrase
  - With the AES key decrypt the beginning of the DMG file and verify the first sector is correct (only needed with v2)





# VileFault

- Other attacks
  - Swap
    - The key can get paged to disk (whoops!)
    - Encrypted swap isn't enabled by default
  - Hibernation
    - You can extract the FileVault key from a hibernation file
    - Ring-0 code can find the key in memory
  - Weakest Link
    - The password used for the FileVault image is the same as your login password
    - Salted SHA-1 is much faster to crack than PBKDF2 (1 iteration vs 1000)
    - The RSA key is easier to crack than PBKDF2



# Performance Comparison

## PC

### vfcrack


|                  |          |
|------------------|----------|
| 800MHz P3        | ~100/sec |
| 3.6GHz P4        | ~180/sec |
| AMD Opteron      | ~200/sec |
| 2.16GHz IntelDuo | ~200/sec |

## FPGA

### vfcrack

|            |             |
|------------|-------------|
| LX25       | ~2,000/sec  |
| LX50       | ~6,000/sec  |
| 15 Cluster | ~30,000/sec |


Demo



# jc-aircrack


- Johnny Cache added FPGA support to jc-aircrack
  - Uses all of the standard aircrack statistical methods
  - Helps with smaller capture files
  - You can offload brute forcing the lower key byte possibilities to the FPGA
  - Uses a new common FPGA WEP cracking library
- Performance
  - Performance will vary depending on capture file
  - Should typically get about 30x speed increase when brute forcing

Demo




# Works in Progress

- **GSM A5/1**
  - Real working open-source implementation
  - We can capture GSM packets
  - We can break A5/1 (using a few different methods)
  - Check out our talk at the CCCamp



# Conclusion

- Get an FPGA and start cracking!
- Make use of your hardware to break crypto
- <64-bit just doesn't cut it anymore
- Choose bad passwords (please!)




# Hardware Used

- Pico E-12
  - Compact Flash
  - 64 MB Flash
  - 128 MB SDRAM
  - Gigabit Ethernet
  - Optional 450MHz PowerPC 405








# Hardware Used


- Pico E-12 Super Cluster
  - 15 - E-12's
  - 2 - 2.8GHz Pentium 4's
  - 2 - 120GB HDD
  - 2 - DVD-RW
  - 550 Watt Power Supply






# Future Hardware


- Pico E-16
  - ExpressCard 34
    - Works in MacBook Pros
    - 2.5Gbps full-duplex
  - Virtex-5 LX50 (~2x faster)
  - 32MB SRAM
  - External ExpressCard Chip
  - Made for Crypto Cracking
  - More affordable





# Thanks

- Johnny Cache (airbase/jc-wepcrack/jc-aircrack)
- Jacob Appelbaum & Ralf-Philip Weinmann (FileVault)
- Thierry Zoller & Eric Sesterhenn (BTCrack)
- Viewers like you



# Questions?

- David Hulton
  - [david@toorcon.org](mailto:david@toorcon.org)
  - <http://openciphers.sf.net>
  - <http://www.picocomputing.com>
  - <http://www.toorcon.org>
  - <http://www.802.11mercenary.net>