1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:01,751 BRENDAN: my name is Brendan O'Connor. 2 00:00:01,751 --> 00:00:04,334 There are three take aways 3 00:00:04,334 --> 00:00:14,292 the things we carry 4 00:00:14,292 --> 00:00:16,709 at every single level. 5 00:00:16,709 --> 00:00:19,751 We as a community have forgotten that 6 00:00:19,751 --> 00:00:21,417 to be a goal. 7 00:00:21,417 --> 00:00:22,999 Whoops, the Goons are noticed. 8 00:00:22,999 --> 00:00:24,999 Always! 9 00:00:37,250 --> 00:00:38,999 (Cheers and applause! 10 00:00:38,999 --> 00:00:44,000 ) Raise your hand if this 11 00:00:46,999 --> 00:00:53,334 (Laughter.) You, the man knows how 12 00:00:54,501 --> 00:00:57,167 I got to get somebody tall to do that. 13 00:00:57,751 --> 00:00:59,542 The last guy 14 00:00:59,542 --> 00:01:01,375 so cool your jets. 15 00:01:01,375 --> 00:01:04,792 I want to introduce you to 2500 16 00:01:10,167 --> 00:01:13,125 (Applause.) So please, welcome 17 00:01:13,125 --> 00:01:16,584 first time speaker, congratulations! 18 00:01:16,584 --> 00:01:17,751 (Applause.) Up yours! 19 00:01:24,459 --> 00:01:26,709 Oh my God we have 20 00:01:26,709 --> 00:01:28,083 all afternoon! 21 00:01:28,417 --> 00:01:30,083 BRENDAN: God, I love DEF CON. 22 00:01:41,626 --> 00:01:44,918 Now the gentleman 23 00:01:51,999 --> 00:01:57,292 We have forgotten to protect ourselves, 24 00:01:57,292 --> 00:02:01,459 many on the stage saying we have 25 00:02:01,459 --> 00:02:06,999 the evil hackers and they're using 26 00:02:06,999 --> 00:02:12,459 we have forgotten, it's important 27 00:02:12,459 --> 00:02:16,709 of our users and it's become 28 00:02:16,709 --> 00:02:22,375 Data into encrypted streams in order 29 00:02:22,375 --> 00:02:26,083 and we will show you examples later. 30 00:02:27,083 --> 00:02:29,250 Final take away, 31 00:02:29,250 --> 00:02:30,999 into the crowd. 32 00:02:31,083 --> 00:02:34,375 Everyone has seen 33 00:02:34,375 --> 00:02:39,083 in which hooking up a cell phone 34 00:02:39,083 --> 00:02:43,250 and someone going, oh my God 35 00:02:43,250 --> 00:02:49,083 into a mall we'll never find him there are 36 00:02:49,083 --> 00:02:53,501 That doesn't work and it doesn't work 37 00:02:53,501 --> 00:02:57,501 going to work for everybody 38 00:02:57,501 --> 00:02:59,999 If you can put together 39 00:02:59,999 --> 00:03:02,834 everyone in the mall, 40 00:03:02,834 --> 00:03:05,167 out important information 41 00:03:05,167 --> 00:03:07,626 and use it against them. 42 00:03:08,209 --> 00:03:13,918 We need fundamental changes 43 00:03:13,918 --> 00:03:18,709 to request too much data and then 44 00:03:18,709 --> 00:03:23,584 as someone who has worked 45 00:03:23,584 --> 00:03:28,584 of transactions, we can't leak 46 00:03:28,584 --> 00:03:34,083 because our clients are 47 00:03:34,417 --> 00:03:37,125 If we don't do this we have lost 48 00:03:37,125 --> 00:03:39,834 adversaries and there 49 00:03:39,834 --> 00:03:41,834 a software developer. 50 00:03:42,626 --> 00:03:44,584 Why are we doing this? 51 00:03:45,083 --> 00:03:48,334 These guys have tons of information 52 00:03:48,334 --> 00:03:52,459 through Rio and there are hundreds 53 00:03:53,083 --> 00:03:57,999 And I was recently told 54 00:03:57,999 --> 00:04:02,959 is the government's area, 55 00:04:05,918 --> 00:04:07,999 This means two things. 56 00:04:08,999 --> 00:04:11,959 One, a lot 57 00:04:11,959 --> 00:04:15,709 is terrifying and, two, I am 58 00:04:15,834 --> 00:04:19,792 Not just because I told you this 59 00:04:19,792 --> 00:04:22,999 my sister well enough and 60 00:04:22,999 --> 00:04:25,083 and it's too late! 61 00:04:25,375 --> 00:04:27,709 Those of us in the room know that 62 00:04:27,709 --> 00:04:32,125 at securing things other than throwing 63 00:04:32,375 --> 00:04:37,083 But the government has no mop reply 64 00:04:37,083 --> 00:04:38,584 The good guys have it. 65 00:04:38,584 --> 00:04:42,250 But that's not true. 66 00:04:42,250 --> 00:04:45,250 We may look 67 00:04:45,250 --> 00:04:51,083 in a bunch of countries that are not 68 00:04:51,083 --> 00:04:54,542 repressive governments and 69 00:04:54,542 --> 00:04:59,709 I'm hearing "the NSA needs that" 70 00:04:59,709 --> 00:05:03,626 as only the government can spy on us. 71 00:05:04,250 --> 00:05:07,501 We hear that sunlight 72 00:05:07,999 --> 00:05:10,999 A recent study showed that cops 73 00:05:10,999 --> 00:05:13,083 less likely 74 00:05:13,083 --> 00:05:17,083 in complaints, and 60% les likely 75 00:05:17,083 --> 00:05:19,959 When they did use force those officers 76 00:05:19,959 --> 00:05:23,626 in using the least amount 77 00:05:23,876 --> 00:05:26,375 This affect was not duplicated, 78 00:05:26,375 --> 00:05:29,834 and their forces refusing to wear 79 00:05:29,999 --> 00:05:31,751 If we can see what's going 80 00:05:31,751 --> 00:05:34,542 at our government and make sure it 81 00:05:34,542 --> 00:05:36,792 and safely as possible. 82 00:05:36,792 --> 00:05:40,667 If not, we are subject to blackmail, 83 00:05:40,667 --> 00:05:42,626 See, for example, Aaron Schwartz. 84 00:05:42,709 --> 00:05:45,709 So we need sunlight, 85 00:05:45,709 --> 00:05:47,751 We don't have time to wait 86 00:05:47,751 --> 00:05:49,209 Anyone know what this photo is? 87 00:05:49,209 --> 00:05:51,876 AUDIENCE MEMBER: A nuclear test. 88 00:05:51,876 --> 00:05:55,209 BRENDAN O'CONNOR: It's 89 00:05:55,209 --> 00:05:56,209 Tsar Bomba! 90 00:05:56,501 --> 00:05:58,250 We need to blow up this situation 91 00:05:58,250 --> 00:06:00,999 to every single developer 92 00:06:00,999 --> 00:06:04,542 is no longer an acceptable use 93 00:06:04,999 --> 00:06:07,584 So I get called a stalker, not this stalker, 94 00:06:07,584 --> 00:06:10,501 an adorable kitten that 95 00:06:10,584 --> 00:06:12,999 I get called this kind of stalker. 96 00:06:12,999 --> 00:06:15,417 We all do creepy work in this room, 97 00:06:15,417 --> 00:06:17,876 to raise the issue 98 00:06:17,876 --> 00:06:19,834 of privacy 99 00:06:19,834 --> 00:06:22,876 not just the "good guys," such 100 00:06:22,876 --> 00:06:24,626 for good or evil. 101 00:06:24,999 --> 00:06:27,375 CreepyDOL 102 00:06:27,375 --> 00:06:30,667 combines wireless sniffing, 103 00:06:30,667 --> 00:06:32,918 visualization and grenade style 104 00:06:32,918 --> 00:06:35,918 to do realtime personnel tracking 105 00:06:35,918 --> 00:06:39,626 on a major urban area in realtime 106 00:06:39,626 --> 00:06:41,375 It is stalking as a service. 107 00:06:41,375 --> 00:06:43,125 That's what we're here today to see. 108 00:06:43,125 --> 00:06:44,999 There is one complication thought, 109 00:06:44,999 --> 00:06:46,999 or Andrew Auernheimer. 110 00:06:46,999 --> 00:06:48,918 The United States government has 111 00:06:48,918 --> 00:06:51,209 against legitimate security research, 112 00:06:51,209 --> 00:06:54,626 of us think that's probably not 113 00:06:54,999 --> 00:06:57,167 A lot of people in this room don't 114 00:06:57,167 --> 00:07:00,709 because he's a "troll" and 115 00:07:00,709 --> 00:07:02,999 things about nice people. 116 00:07:03,292 --> 00:07:04,751 But it doesn't matter. 117 00:07:04,792 --> 00:07:07,542 The thing about criminal law 118 00:07:07,542 --> 00:07:09,125 at this apple. 119 00:07:09,125 --> 00:07:11,667 Mighty Casey gets three strikes, 120 00:07:11,667 --> 00:07:15,083 We get one in the 3rd Circuit, 121 00:07:15,250 --> 00:07:18,792 We need to take action 122 00:07:18,792 --> 00:07:22,999 researchers even when they seem 123 00:07:22,999 --> 00:07:25,125 but for all of us. 124 00:07:25,125 --> 00:07:26,792 If everyone in this room isn't going 125 00:07:26,792 --> 00:07:30,667 by this time next year we need 126 00:07:30,667 --> 00:07:33,792 Otherwise, hey that was only 127 00:07:33,792 --> 00:07:35,751 Except that Weev was in Arkansas. 128 00:07:35,918 --> 00:07:36,501 They dragged him 129 00:07:36,501 --> 00:07:37,959 because they thought 130 00:07:37,959 --> 00:07:40,709 a more favorable hearing, and 131 00:07:40,834 --> 00:07:42,125 Every internet connection goes 132 00:07:42,125 --> 00:07:44,083 in the United States, so 133 00:07:44,083 --> 00:07:46,459 up in prison we better protect Weev. 134 00:07:46,459 --> 00:07:48,834 This affects 135 00:07:49,083 --> 00:07:52,125 First, this side note: I wrote this 136 00:07:52,125 --> 00:07:55,999 with all the people on this list, 137 00:07:55,999 --> 00:07:59,125 a great, hacker lawyer, 138 00:07:59,125 --> 00:08:02,501 of people in this room, or 139 00:08:02,501 --> 00:08:06,709 Matthew Green, professor at Hopkins, 140 00:08:06,709 --> 00:08:09,125 Jericho "Space Rogan" Mudge. 141 00:08:09,125 --> 00:08:11,167 These are people you have heard 142 00:08:11,167 --> 00:08:14,209 be supporting even 143 00:08:14,209 --> 00:08:16,667 This affects everyone one of us, 144 00:08:16,667 --> 00:08:19,083 professors or itinerant hackers. 145 00:08:19,417 --> 00:08:20,999 And in the meantime we have 146 00:08:20,999 --> 00:08:24,751 because we cannot trust legal actions 147 00:08:25,083 --> 00:08:28,751 Therefore, CreepyDOL has not been 148 00:08:28,751 --> 00:08:32,834 because even though every court 149 00:08:32,834 --> 00:08:36,083 is A okay, same as sitting 150 00:08:36,083 --> 00:08:39,292 the guy next to you talk too loudly 151 00:08:39,292 --> 00:08:42,751 about raising his next 152 00:08:42,751 --> 00:08:46,083 which happens way too often, 153 00:08:46,083 --> 00:08:50,751 on the government not prosecuting 154 00:08:50,834 --> 00:08:52,125 I leave the next step 155 00:08:52,125 --> 00:08:54,250 to a braver researcher. 156 00:08:54,751 --> 00:08:56,375 Since I'm 157 00:08:56,375 --> 00:08:58,626 a serious disclaimer. 158 00:09:04,209 --> 00:09:08,167 (Laughter.) "This is not intended 159 00:09:10,709 --> 00:09:13,334 Let's talk 160 00:09:13,334 --> 00:09:15,459 CreepyDOL is not CFT work. 161 00:09:15,459 --> 00:09:17,999 I had to make this extremely clear 162 00:09:17,999 --> 00:09:19,709 DARPA tries real hard not 163 00:09:19,709 --> 00:09:21,667 out because they have had a bit 164 00:09:21,667 --> 00:09:23,834 in the last couple decades. 165 00:09:23,834 --> 00:09:27,083 But two CFT contracts did let me build 166 00:09:27,083 --> 00:09:29,999 system, which 167 00:09:29,999 --> 00:09:33,459 and the visualization system, 168 00:09:33,459 --> 00:09:36,083 clear at the moment called NAUM. 169 00:09:36,167 --> 00:09:38,584 So thanks, Mudge, if he's here, 170 00:09:38,584 --> 00:09:40,999 with his face on 'em with pride. 171 00:09:41,125 --> 00:09:43,334 And this is a brief roadmap. 172 00:09:43,334 --> 00:09:43,999 First let's talk 173 00:09:43,999 --> 00:09:45,626 for this project. 174 00:09:45,834 --> 00:09:47,209 First we want 175 00:09:47,209 --> 00:09:49,417 from wireless, 176 00:09:49,417 --> 00:09:51,751 in the middle" partially 177 00:09:51,751 --> 00:09:53,918 to the "bad" kind of federal prison 178 00:09:53,918 --> 00:09:57,167 because design constraints help us 179 00:09:57,167 --> 00:09:58,999 And it turns out that doing 180 00:09:58,999 --> 00:10:02,542 like the Pineapple Jasager attack, 181 00:10:02,542 --> 00:10:03,999 We can do this without them. 182 00:10:04,125 --> 00:10:09,918 As you turn on a wireless device, 183 00:10:09,918 --> 00:10:15,999 of all known networks, 184 00:10:16,667 --> 00:10:19,125 As soon as a device thinks it 185 00:10:19,125 --> 00:10:22,459 all of its sync services will kick 186 00:10:22,459 --> 00:10:24,999 That means Drop Box, iMessage 187 00:10:25,042 --> 00:10:27,792 A lot of those 188 00:10:27,792 --> 00:10:31,334 get cool data from and 189 00:10:31,334 --> 00:10:34,000 that have public wifi, 190 00:10:34,000 --> 00:10:36,709 of cool data pretty often. 191 00:10:37,542 --> 00:10:40,125 Over unencrypted wifi 192 00:10:40,125 --> 00:10:43,417 that's what we mean 193 00:10:43,417 --> 00:10:46,918 can see everything they're talking 194 00:10:46,918 --> 00:10:49,584 Sometimes they're talking over SSL, 195 00:10:49,584 --> 00:10:53,209 is in theory encrypted, but it turns 196 00:10:53,209 --> 00:10:57,000 is "us" have been leaking this cool data 197 00:10:57,000 --> 00:10:59,209 and I don't know why. 198 00:11:00,417 --> 00:11:04,292 As they set it up or as we look 199 00:11:04,292 --> 00:11:08,209 to see neat data and the cool part 200 00:11:08,209 --> 00:11:12,876 an awesome primary key we can just sit 201 00:11:13,083 --> 00:11:15,999 So maybe you make one small identity 202 00:11:15,999 --> 00:11:19,959 maybe halfway around the world 203 00:11:19,959 --> 00:11:24,125 with little boxes you drop another 204 00:11:24,125 --> 00:11:27,999 up a profile of who you are, 205 00:11:27,999 --> 00:11:31,667 is not that long range so 206 00:11:31,667 --> 00:11:33,375 on top of me. 207 00:11:34,250 --> 00:11:36,792 Once we get one to ten 208 00:11:36,792 --> 00:11:39,709 over an area we have time 209 00:11:39,709 --> 00:11:44,167 I know your patterns and practice 210 00:11:44,167 --> 00:11:48,999 to you and if I want to blackmail you, 211 00:11:48,999 --> 00:11:52,459 and that you most don't want exposed. 212 00:11:52,459 --> 00:11:53,083 This 213 00:11:53,083 --> 00:11:55,083 knowledge is power, right? 214 00:11:57,334 --> 00:11:59,250 Our second goal 215 00:11:59,250 --> 00:12:01,501 without communications. 216 00:12:01,501 --> 00:12:06,751 It's easy to say I will go to Verizon 217 00:12:07,709 --> 00:12:10,626 The problem is that is expensive 218 00:12:10,626 --> 00:12:14,876 a lawsuit student and when you go 219 00:12:14,876 --> 00:12:18,999 I would like to apply for a grant 220 00:12:18,999 --> 00:12:22,626 oh I'm doing Distributed sensor 221 00:12:22,626 --> 00:12:26,209 they back away slowly and then call 222 00:12:26,209 --> 00:12:27,918 (Laughter.) My Dean 223 00:12:27,918 --> 00:12:32,083 will not mention her name on stage 224 00:12:32,083 --> 00:12:34,918 to fund my work anytime soon. 225 00:12:36,083 --> 00:12:39,125 The other reason we're not going 226 00:12:39,125 --> 00:12:43,375 the other cell provider is it provides 227 00:12:43,375 --> 00:12:45,125 out who I am. 228 00:12:45,125 --> 00:12:51,083 They pick up the box, read the ID 229 00:12:51,709 --> 00:12:54,999 Who has this device, we would 230 00:12:54,999 --> 00:12:57,334 the United States government. 231 00:12:57,626 --> 00:13:00,083 The tele come providers have 232 00:13:00,083 --> 00:13:04,125 in their offices just created 233 00:13:17,083 --> 00:13:20,999 Finally we have a third goal which 234 00:13:20,999 --> 00:13:24,999 the slides make tough "D" cry it's 235 00:13:25,083 --> 00:13:27,876 When one has 236 00:13:27,876 --> 00:13:30,459 to people this is a problem. 237 00:13:30,459 --> 00:13:31,999 It's the difference 238 00:13:31,999 --> 00:13:34,876 and writing a zero day and 239 00:13:34,876 --> 00:13:37,167 When every script kitty sitting 240 00:13:37,167 --> 00:13:41,125 the entire city, maybe we 241 00:13:41,334 --> 00:13:42,999 In the meantime we are not. 242 00:13:45,542 --> 00:13:48,375 Let's talk about background, couple 243 00:13:48,375 --> 00:13:50,209 One, I would like to pour one 244 00:13:50,209 --> 00:13:51,999 people everywhere. 245 00:13:52,125 --> 00:13:55,542 This works kind of like one 246 00:13:55,542 --> 00:14:00,999 because mostly they're this ultra low 247 00:14:00,999 --> 00:14:04,999 they he work well, 248 00:14:04,999 --> 00:14:09,709 and they sacrifice everything else 249 00:14:09,709 --> 00:14:12,918 He they work in horrible language 250 00:14:15,209 --> 00:14:20,834 But they sacrifice cost, 251 00:14:20,834 --> 00:14:23,876 of $600 apiece each. 252 00:14:23,876 --> 00:14:24,876 That's not good. 253 00:14:24,876 --> 00:14:28,083 I want something that I can write 254 00:14:28,083 --> 00:14:32,083 in Linux and an order 255 00:14:32,999 --> 00:14:38,459 And large scale surveillance, 256 00:14:38,459 --> 00:14:42,375 assume that 257 00:14:42,375 --> 00:14:47,876 all of the problems in CreepyDOL 258 00:14:47,876 --> 00:14:53,709 they will be happy to do as soon 259 00:14:53,709 --> 00:14:58,125 so thank Mr. Snowden, pour one 260 00:14:58,125 --> 00:15:01,999 because this stuff is really hard! 261 00:15:03,999 --> 00:15:06,626 Let's talk about the keep architecture. 262 00:15:06,959 --> 00:15:10,751 First, hardware 37 this 263 00:15:10,751 --> 00:15:15,999 a terribly tortured acronym 264 00:15:15,999 --> 00:15:18,999 and they love acronyms. 265 00:15:24,999 --> 00:15:29,999 The same thing that 266 00:15:29,999 --> 00:15:36,083 decided they could sell it if they put it 267 00:15:36,292 --> 00:15:41,542 When those failed I could buy it 268 00:15:41,542 --> 00:15:45,959 like to thank them for my research. 269 00:15:45,999 --> 00:15:48,876 The other thing is it fits 270 00:15:48,876 --> 00:15:52,167 how many of you checked theirs 271 00:15:52,167 --> 00:15:53,667 for me? 272 00:15:55,209 --> 00:16:00,959 (Applause.) This is the old version 273 00:16:00,959 --> 00:16:05,501 for the F bomb version 1 as it is for two. 274 00:16:07,125 --> 00:16:11,209 If you can look at my hand and see it, 275 00:16:11,209 --> 00:16:13,250 of good hardware. 276 00:16:13,250 --> 00:16:16,876 It holds a Raspberry Pi, model A, 277 00:16:16,876 --> 00:16:21,584 because every hacker needs 278 00:16:21,584 --> 00:16:24,584 I would like to apologize 279 00:16:24,584 --> 00:16:25,959 I bought 10% of the U.S. 280 00:16:25,959 --> 00:16:27,999 supply of the first round of Model As, 281 00:16:27,999 --> 00:16:30,999 they were only going to bring 100 282 00:16:30,999 --> 00:16:35,083 so I'm sorry I think I screwed 283 00:16:35,375 --> 00:16:38,083 There is a cheap plastic case, 284 00:16:38,083 --> 00:16:41,542 adapters that occasionally electric cute 285 00:16:50,999 --> 00:16:55,999 (Laughter.) It just happened last week, 286 00:16:55,999 --> 00:17:00,876 "only buy original Apple" so thanks, 287 00:17:00,876 --> 00:17:05,459 and hey I plugged it 288 00:17:05,459 --> 00:17:06,459 That's the idea. 289 00:17:06,459 --> 00:17:08,999 (Laughter.) So why two wifi? 290 00:17:09,334 --> 00:17:10,999 I don't want to bring 291 00:17:10,999 --> 00:17:12,375 so instead I'm going 292 00:17:12,375 --> 00:17:14,542 centralized communications. 293 00:17:14,542 --> 00:17:16,375 And we connect to local wifi. 294 00:17:16,709 --> 00:17:18,626 Brendan, 295 00:17:18,626 --> 00:17:21,999 is there municipal wifi that actually 296 00:17:21,999 --> 00:17:25,250 No, there is wifi that doesn't work, 297 00:17:25,250 --> 00:17:28,083 is a lot of coffee shops and bars. 298 00:17:28,083 --> 00:17:32,167 Every random dive bar has wifi now 299 00:17:32,167 --> 00:17:33,334 A lot 300 00:17:33,334 --> 00:17:36,167 agreements, though, 301 00:17:36,167 --> 00:17:38,459 your imbedded code sad. 302 00:17:38,667 --> 00:17:41,167 So I wrote 303 00:17:41,167 --> 00:17:43,584 It clicks on buttons so you don't have 304 00:17:43,709 --> 00:17:46,999 Available in GitHub right now, 305 00:17:52,999 --> 00:17:55,083 And again, thank you DARPA. 306 00:17:55,083 --> 00:17:57,167 (Applause.) Now we're going 307 00:17:57,167 --> 00:17:59,667 building from the bottom up. 308 00:17:59,667 --> 00:18:00,999 We talked about hardware, 309 00:18:00,999 --> 00:18:03,959 about the middle layer, 310 00:18:03,999 --> 00:18:04,959 REDDI CLE 311 00:18:04,959 --> 00:18:08,125 and control software, designed 312 00:18:08,125 --> 00:18:09,751 This is the first 313 00:18:09,751 --> 00:18:11,209 I mentioned. 314 00:18:11,209 --> 00:18:15,999 I made a whole presentation last year, 315 00:18:16,250 --> 00:18:17,959 There has been a whole rewrite. 316 00:18:17,959 --> 00:18:20,459 It still works the same, 317 00:18:20,459 --> 00:18:23,209 and occasionally it doesn't break 318 00:18:23,209 --> 00:18:24,999 on my keyboard. 319 00:18:25,417 --> 00:18:30,501 Each radical node runs Couch TV, 320 00:18:30,501 --> 00:18:34,417 nicely, plus Engine X, Torr, 321 00:18:34,417 --> 00:18:38,999 software, a couple of Ruby Scripts, 322 00:18:38,999 --> 00:18:44,459 is Open Source it let's notes combine 323 00:18:44,459 --> 00:18:48,083 to every other node and we can do data 324 00:18:48,083 --> 00:18:52,375 in the hope that we can get the data 325 00:18:52,375 --> 00:18:55,083 with guns shoot the box. 326 00:18:59,667 --> 00:19:03,417 To make reverse engineering radically 327 00:19:03,417 --> 00:19:05,999 you boot a node 328 00:19:05,999 --> 00:19:10,083 a full description key, reads it, 329 00:19:10,083 --> 00:19:13,751 the pin out and you throw it 330 00:19:13,751 --> 00:19:15,542 at their head. 331 00:19:15,999 --> 00:19:19,334 Once you've done that, 332 00:19:19,334 --> 00:19:21,834 Boot on it, you're good. 333 00:19:21,834 --> 00:19:22,584 If you pull it 334 00:19:22,584 --> 00:19:24,501 the encryption keys. 335 00:19:24,501 --> 00:19:26,709 As for Cold Boot, here is the thing. 336 00:19:26,751 --> 00:19:29,083 How many people dump liquid nitrogen 337 00:19:29,083 --> 00:19:30,834 in their house? 338 00:19:31,334 --> 00:19:34,626 There's two people who dump liquid 339 00:19:34,626 --> 00:19:35,999 I would love your house! 340 00:19:35,999 --> 00:19:37,999 For the rest of you, as soon 341 00:19:37,999 --> 00:19:41,125 to dump liquid nitrogen 342 00:19:41,125 --> 00:19:44,918 we have all won and we can go 343 00:19:46,834 --> 00:19:50,918 CreepyDOL is just 344 00:19:50,918 --> 00:19:55,876 they all do the network thing so 345 00:19:55,876 --> 00:19:59,792 to one place it's as good as home. 346 00:20:00,042 --> 00:20:02,709 Let's talk about the design 347 00:20:02,709 --> 00:20:04,876 It's a creepy doll, right? 348 00:20:04,959 --> 00:20:11,918 It's going to do as much as possible 349 00:20:15,375 --> 00:20:20,334 They have 256 RAM we don't need that 350 00:20:20,334 --> 00:20:25,626 the reason we do that is to be nice 351 00:20:25,626 --> 00:20:29,584 donate money 352 00:20:29,626 --> 00:20:34,792 We don't want to send them home 353 00:20:34,792 --> 00:20:40,751 to TOR and no one will track him 354 00:20:40,751 --> 00:20:45,959 at us so Distributed query 355 00:20:45,959 --> 00:20:51,042 all the data, on the PCaps we save 356 00:20:51,042 --> 00:20:54,876 we never send the PCaps home. 357 00:20:54,876 --> 00:20:58,459 We do centralized query 358 00:20:58,459 --> 00:21:01,459 types of questions, 359 00:21:01,459 --> 00:21:05,959 for coffee at 8:00 in the morning 360 00:21:05,959 --> 00:21:10,083 in the afternoon once you drag your 361 00:21:10,209 --> 00:21:12,999 We do these things 362 00:21:12,999 --> 00:21:16,167 because even though Distributed nodes 363 00:21:16,167 --> 00:21:20,292 they don't have hard drive storage, 364 00:21:20,292 --> 00:21:24,334 to do these data mining queries back 365 00:21:24,334 --> 00:21:29,083 out of the grid as fast as possible, 366 00:21:29,083 --> 00:21:34,125 and then we have a centralized point 367 00:21:34,125 --> 00:21:38,083 It's not command and control networks, 368 00:21:38,083 --> 00:21:41,626 And I'm serious about the X Box, 369 00:21:41,626 --> 00:21:44,083 We call this NAUM. 370 00:21:47,792 --> 00:21:54,959 Let's talk about the observation filters, 371 00:21:54,959 --> 00:22:01,125 they are per application and they take 372 00:22:01,125 --> 00:22:06,626 is for drop box, okay 373 00:22:06,626 --> 00:22:08,918 good to know. 374 00:22:08,999 --> 00:22:13,876 There is another filter that's processed 375 00:22:13,999 --> 00:22:17,083 Look at the last line this is a screen 376 00:22:17,083 --> 00:22:20,542 is more data than 377 00:22:21,999 --> 00:22:24,667 I know exactly what version 378 00:22:24,667 --> 00:22:27,626 but if you didn't that would be useful. 379 00:22:27,626 --> 00:22:31,999 I know what version 380 00:22:31,999 --> 00:22:38,083 to exploit it remotely and I have 381 00:22:39,125 --> 00:22:41,999 In addition 382 00:22:41,999 --> 00:22:46,334 There is a lot of data and media, 383 00:22:46,626 --> 00:22:51,876 Observation filters are per service, 384 00:22:51,876 --> 00:22:56,334 is that we build up tiny bits 385 00:22:56,334 --> 00:23:00,834 and co less them 386 00:23:06,999 --> 00:23:09,083 We get a little bit 387 00:23:09,083 --> 00:23:11,626 from the feed reader, how many 388 00:23:11,626 --> 00:23:14,209 after Google reader collapsed? 389 00:23:14,918 --> 00:23:16,709 About a quarter of you. 390 00:23:16,918 --> 00:23:20,999 How many you watch the stuff 391 00:23:21,375 --> 00:23:23,083 Nobody. 392 00:23:23,375 --> 00:23:27,918 Turns out the ones that I switched 393 00:23:27,918 --> 00:23:29,834 in the clear. 394 00:23:29,876 --> 00:23:33,334 Weirdly they transmit my real name 395 00:23:33,334 --> 00:23:36,542 an authentication cookie 396 00:23:36,542 --> 00:23:40,334 of Fire Sheep because a lot 397 00:23:40,334 --> 00:23:42,792 with Google Reader, 398 00:23:42,792 --> 00:23:45,999 out of your online dating profile 399 00:23:45,999 --> 00:23:48,209 and you are disgusting! 400 00:23:51,959 --> 00:23:54,999 (Laughter.) Back to the NAUM filters. 401 00:23:54,999 --> 00:23:57,959 There are the nosiness filters and 402 00:23:57,959 --> 00:24:00,999 Nosiness takes a little bit of data 403 00:24:00,999 --> 00:24:05,792 with user names, email addresses, 404 00:24:05,792 --> 00:24:08,083 it checks 405 00:24:08,083 --> 00:24:10,834 and even though we have been 406 00:24:10,834 --> 00:24:14,125 about the forgot password 407 00:24:14,125 --> 00:24:16,751 they have that system. 408 00:24:22,459 --> 00:24:26,375 I could then before break 409 00:24:26,375 --> 00:24:30,083 things and be more or less 410 00:24:30,083 --> 00:24:32,999 Finally there is mining nodes 411 00:24:32,999 --> 00:24:35,417 and do pattern and practice. 412 00:24:37,667 --> 00:24:40,709 I mentioned before where do they go 413 00:24:40,709 --> 00:24:43,792 that's one thing, 414 00:24:43,792 --> 00:24:45,542 For instance, 415 00:24:45,542 --> 00:24:49,999 around a city, I see it everywhere, 416 00:24:50,999 --> 00:24:54,501 What if I see another device that only 417 00:24:54,501 --> 00:24:57,292 every time it exists it's 418 00:24:57,292 --> 00:25:00,209 as the first device that I saw. 419 00:25:00,667 --> 00:25:03,250 So what happens 420 00:25:03,250 --> 00:25:07,083 and a second device turns o works 421 00:25:07,083 --> 00:25:10,999 off and I don't see it again 422 00:25:10,999 --> 00:25:12,834 That's what we call a laptop. 423 00:25:14,167 --> 00:25:18,792 Once I've seen that for a while, 424 00:25:18,792 --> 00:25:20,959 instead of two. 425 00:25:20,999 --> 00:25:24,918 So even if you thought, hey, 426 00:25:24,918 --> 00:25:28,959 but I only do my creepy stuff 427 00:25:28,959 --> 00:25:33,959 because Brandon will never see me, 428 00:25:33,959 --> 00:25:37,083 the shops that you go to, 429 00:25:37,083 --> 00:25:41,250 I didn't know you could buy them that 430 00:25:41,250 --> 00:25:45,083 is the CreepyDOL architecture, 431 00:25:45,083 --> 00:25:48,918 they're connected to every other node. 432 00:25:49,083 --> 00:25:53,751 They go to a sync node and the idea 433 00:25:53,751 --> 00:25:57,083 for information propagation 434 00:25:57,083 --> 00:26:00,959 of these boxes I run it 435 00:26:03,125 --> 00:26:06,918 It's job is to send 436 00:26:06,918 --> 00:26:09,918 in another storage mechanism. 437 00:26:09,918 --> 00:26:14,626 I have two different storage that I use 438 00:26:14,626 --> 00:26:19,250 and it's an all in memory 439 00:26:19,250 --> 00:26:24,542 if I had big data I could throw them 440 00:26:24,542 --> 00:26:29,626 in another one and it allows me 441 00:26:36,375 --> 00:26:41,292 Then I have translation 442 00:26:41,292 --> 00:26:44,501 into a saner format. 443 00:26:44,999 --> 00:26:48,626 Finally I run them 444 00:26:48,626 --> 00:26:53,918 down in parenthesis there it's running 445 00:26:53,918 --> 00:26:58,626 and my people are real, 446 00:26:59,834 --> 00:27:04,083 I'm getting GPS data so I might 447 00:27:14,083 --> 00:27:19,918 You the Unity game engine it's free 448 00:27:19,959 --> 00:27:22,999 The second note, Java Script 449 00:27:22,999 --> 00:27:26,876 by a proprietary games manufacturer 450 00:27:26,876 --> 00:27:30,876 into the dot net Lang beige 451 00:27:30,876 --> 00:27:36,709 and it's a horrible debugging platform, 452 00:27:36,709 --> 00:27:40,876 Java script errors 453 00:27:40,876 --> 00:27:44,999 by four other language 454 00:27:44,999 --> 00:27:50,083 is it works well the guys 455 00:27:59,709 --> 00:28:05,792 If you have ever tried to write utilization, 456 00:28:05,792 --> 00:28:10,584 say put this here and it works well you 457 00:28:10,584 --> 00:28:15,250 between latitude and longitude 458 00:28:15,250 --> 00:28:19,584 or Windows, Linux, Android, Wii 459 00:28:24,334 --> 00:28:29,959 Part of the side affect is you said wait, 460 00:28:29,959 --> 00:28:32,584 how do you hold that? 461 00:28:32,584 --> 00:28:34,626 I don't. 462 00:28:34,626 --> 00:28:38,209 That's why we have the servers, 463 00:28:38,209 --> 00:28:42,999 run it on an iPad and don't have 464 00:28:42,999 --> 00:28:46,459 They talk to each other 465 00:28:46,459 --> 00:28:50,999 over unencrypted HCPD (Laughter.) 466 00:28:50,999 --> 00:28:53,999 and see this take place. 467 00:28:55,501 --> 00:28:59,083 Before we do that we have test 468 00:28:59,083 --> 00:29:01,626 how we're all terrified? 469 00:29:01,626 --> 00:29:04,709 If you're not terrified you're not paying 470 00:29:04,709 --> 00:29:07,999 on everybody in the city, which I hate. 471 00:29:07,999 --> 00:29:13,459 This doesn't mean we can't do valid 472 00:29:13,459 --> 00:29:19,083 to see me so you are going to see 473 00:29:19,083 --> 00:29:24,167 in different places and I have tested 474 00:29:24,167 --> 00:29:30,709 of nodes and it works incredibly well 475 00:29:30,709 --> 00:29:32,584 So we never collected any random 476 00:29:32,584 --> 00:29:35,334 because even though it's apparently 477 00:29:35,334 --> 00:29:37,626 of anything anymore 478 00:29:37,626 --> 00:29:39,751 down the third circuit. 479 00:29:44,083 --> 00:29:49,918 Let's watch it, Unity, it's not running 480 00:29:49,999 --> 00:29:51,250 Is it running? 481 00:29:51,250 --> 00:29:52,334 You are going to see a few things 482 00:29:52,334 --> 00:29:54,375 to see them exactly in time. 483 00:29:54,459 --> 00:29:59,167 First you will see the dot move 484 00:29:59,167 --> 00:30:04,417 load, and I will zoom in and out, 485 00:30:04,417 --> 00:30:08,250 and it zooms the data and the map in. 486 00:30:08,375 --> 00:30:11,125 You can hover over nodes, 487 00:30:11,125 --> 00:30:13,792 or how many are in a room 488 00:30:13,792 --> 00:30:16,250 and they're Mac addresses. 489 00:30:16,250 --> 00:30:18,083 At the end, 490 00:30:18,083 --> 00:30:22,125 click on one node and then you see 491 00:30:22,501 --> 00:30:25,999 (Applause.) See, 492 00:30:25,999 --> 00:30:30,999 from a Google feed it's not Google 493 00:30:30,999 --> 00:30:36,626 from an online dating sight whose 494 00:30:36,626 --> 00:30:40,542 because I've heard 495 00:30:40,542 --> 00:30:45,667 even though they haven't heard 496 00:30:51,751 --> 00:30:55,626 You can see that they used log 497 00:30:55,626 --> 00:31:00,626 for every screen sharing site 498 00:31:00,626 --> 00:31:02,083 We have 499 00:31:02,083 --> 00:31:05,209 in the clear exactly what location 500 00:31:05,209 --> 00:31:09,626 is so I can make sure my sensors are 501 00:31:09,626 --> 00:31:12,918 calibrate my own network it's awesome. 502 00:31:13,792 --> 00:31:15,999 Let's talk about future work. 503 00:31:16,542 --> 00:31:20,709 What other applications can we do 504 00:31:20,751 --> 00:31:23,667 Well, one, 505 00:31:23,834 --> 00:31:26,083 Those of you who participated 506 00:31:26,083 --> 00:31:29,125 about "Occupy Wall Street" 507 00:31:29,125 --> 00:31:31,334 movements, have noticed a lot 508 00:31:31,334 --> 00:31:35,083 a mysterious stranger slips 509 00:31:35,083 --> 00:31:38,083 and the mysterious stranger is gone. 510 00:31:38,167 --> 00:31:39,959 It's amazing how this works. 511 00:31:40,334 --> 00:31:43,999 You can use counter infiltration though, 512 00:31:43,999 --> 00:31:45,918 hey, if anybody new shows 513 00:31:45,918 --> 00:31:48,083 scream "bloody murder" so when 514 00:31:48,083 --> 00:31:50,999 bloody murder" alarm goes off, 515 00:31:50,999 --> 00:31:52,959 with the Blackberry. 516 00:31:53,083 --> 00:31:54,083 He's the Fed. 517 00:31:54,999 --> 00:32:03,417 (Laughter.) (Applause.) You can also 518 00:32:03,417 --> 00:32:08,667 for operational securities training. 519 00:32:08,999 --> 00:32:11,209 You can say if I throw this 520 00:32:11,209 --> 00:32:14,918 for devices that I know my agents are 521 00:32:14,918 --> 00:32:16,584 they leaking? 522 00:32:16,584 --> 00:32:17,999 How terrified should I be? 523 00:32:17,999 --> 00:32:19,792 Here's a hint: Really terrified. 524 00:32:20,250 --> 00:32:23,584 You don't need 525 00:32:23,584 --> 00:32:25,999 If you are a huge corporation 526 00:32:25,999 --> 00:32:28,125 who wants 527 00:32:28,125 --> 00:32:30,459 home 528 00:32:30,459 --> 00:32:33,876 spread these over the town where 529 00:32:34,167 --> 00:32:36,250 Every time one of them connects 530 00:32:36,250 --> 00:32:39,083 to send your trade secrets 531 00:32:39,083 --> 00:32:41,542 will know it, so we 532 00:32:41,542 --> 00:32:44,999 through the complete and total invasion 533 00:32:45,876 --> 00:32:48,709 (Laughter.) This is the trade 534 00:32:48,709 --> 00:32:50,999 with and I'm not sure why. 535 00:32:51,083 --> 00:32:53,999 We have accepted that we have no 536 00:32:53,999 --> 00:32:55,999 that our devices are going 537 00:32:55,999 --> 00:32:59,876 to leak increasing amounts of data, 538 00:32:59,876 --> 00:33:03,250 on CNN and say "I don't know why 539 00:33:03,250 --> 00:33:04,999 Here is why. 540 00:33:06,209 --> 00:33:10,417 I don't want you going 541 00:33:10,417 --> 00:33:13,375 doesn't know not 542 00:33:13,375 --> 00:33:16,834 on your wife 543 00:33:16,834 --> 00:33:21,375 let's say I live 6 blocks 544 00:33:21,375 --> 00:33:24,667 around that, 545 00:33:24,667 --> 00:33:27,334 to do something wrong, 546 00:33:27,334 --> 00:33:32,584 to do something wrong and I get maybe 547 00:33:32,709 --> 00:33:36,125 People have been doing this 548 00:33:38,209 --> 00:33:40,083 Here is the difference. 549 00:33:40,083 --> 00:33:43,083 I would have to pay a whole team 550 00:33:43,083 --> 00:33:47,417 to watch senator so and so 551 00:33:50,999 --> 00:33:54,584 So for the cost 552 00:33:54,584 --> 00:33:59,501 in Vegas I can throw 10 or if we want 553 00:33:59,501 --> 00:34:03,834 the person with a weak wallet, 554 00:34:03,834 --> 00:34:07,999 they don't want everyone in the world 555 00:34:12,709 --> 00:34:16,083 Except for Anthony Wiener 556 00:34:16,083 --> 00:34:19,918 and rallies, there is a problem 557 00:34:19,918 --> 00:34:22,626 of evidence during crack downs. 558 00:34:22,626 --> 00:34:25,459 It's hard to know who was 559 00:34:25,459 --> 00:34:28,459 in and take you off, it's hard 560 00:34:28,459 --> 00:34:31,083 they should save in the jails. 561 00:34:33,709 --> 00:34:38,751 You can have it scan your friends 562 00:34:38,751 --> 00:34:43,999 you're offloading your data so that you 563 00:34:43,999 --> 00:34:47,125 which maybe 564 00:34:47,125 --> 00:34:50,167 in jail than they need 565 00:34:50,167 --> 00:34:53,999 an adversary knows what this 566 00:34:53,999 --> 00:34:59,334 they're probably going to unplug it 567 00:34:59,334 --> 00:35:04,792 to happen how to use it doing 568 00:35:04,792 --> 00:35:09,334 on random protesters, even 569 00:35:09,334 --> 00:35:13,834 a kid for walking while drunk which 570 00:35:13,834 --> 00:35:17,209 in college" we're safe 571 00:35:17,209 --> 00:35:23,083 for a long time and that means we get 572 00:35:23,626 --> 00:35:26,334 Let's talk about improvements. 573 00:35:26,334 --> 00:35:29,501 We can scale up, 574 00:35:29,501 --> 00:35:33,751 and because they're not connected 575 00:35:33,751 --> 00:35:39,792 but over the local coffee shop's wifi we 576 00:35:39,792 --> 00:35:44,999 and have five or six overlaid networks 577 00:35:44,999 --> 00:35:48,918 to each other 578 00:35:48,918 --> 00:35:53,999 can do geographical distribution 579 00:35:53,999 --> 00:35:58,999 to delete it off fast enough, 580 00:35:58,999 --> 00:36:01,209 up the networks. 581 00:36:01,209 --> 00:36:03,751 Each network then has one data sig 582 00:36:03,751 --> 00:36:05,999 all into the visualization. 583 00:36:05,999 --> 00:36:07,999 Visualization is good to a couple 584 00:36:07,999 --> 00:36:09,999 if you've got better RAM. 585 00:36:09,999 --> 00:36:12,292 As I mentioned, scaling 586 00:36:12,292 --> 00:36:14,334 especially because there 587 00:36:14,334 --> 00:36:17,334 for Shark that lets you run 588 00:36:17,959 --> 00:36:20,834 This means that, yes, 589 00:36:20,834 --> 00:36:23,167 It's from the cloud so it must be here 590 00:36:23,167 --> 00:36:28,999 (Laughter.) There is other servers, 591 00:36:31,999 --> 00:36:35,083 The visualization is harder 592 00:36:35,083 --> 00:36:37,999 to how many nodes 593 00:36:37,999 --> 00:36:40,876 simultaneously 594 00:36:40,876 --> 00:36:44,375 of books by game developers 595 00:36:44,375 --> 00:36:48,209 they don't check your cred 596 00:36:50,918 --> 00:36:55,834 If you saw the black nodes versus white 597 00:36:55,834 --> 00:36:59,918 nodes but they also do limited distance 598 00:36:59,918 --> 00:37:03,918 in every FPS game you can't see 599 00:37:03,918 --> 00:37:08,667 this allows us to scale visualization 600 00:37:08,667 --> 00:37:12,667 goes everywhere in the world 601 00:37:12,667 --> 00:37:15,999 for 10, 20, $50,000, 602 00:37:15,999 --> 00:37:18,999 is not that big of an investment. 603 00:37:18,999 --> 00:37:20,999 Won't someone think of the children? 604 00:37:21,250 --> 00:37:25,501 (Laughter.) And everything they're 605 00:37:27,292 --> 00:37:30,751 (Laughter.) If you are, you're 606 00:37:31,999 --> 00:37:36,083 (Laughter.) Finally, we can add a lot 607 00:37:36,083 --> 00:37:36,876 How many 608 00:37:36,876 --> 00:37:40,209 with software to find radio 609 00:37:40,709 --> 00:37:41,999 Quite a few people. 610 00:37:43,083 --> 00:37:47,667 There are $10 611 00:37:47,667 --> 00:37:54,083 to find software defined radio 612 00:37:54,083 --> 00:38:00,167 of gigahertz for not a lot 613 00:38:00,167 --> 00:38:06,667 to anything, stalk the Goons for fun 614 00:38:06,667 --> 00:38:15,751 with restaurant pagers or anything else 615 00:38:16,501 --> 00:38:19,459 We can work 616 00:38:19,459 --> 00:38:22,751 to do with tools like Refer 617 00:38:22,751 --> 00:38:26,792 on wireless security and at the end 618 00:38:26,792 --> 00:38:31,999 in a city you don't really need it 619 00:38:32,167 --> 00:38:35,999 We could do active attacks 620 00:38:35,999 --> 00:38:40,751 to make sure devices connect to us 621 00:38:40,876 --> 00:38:43,626 We don't have to, and 622 00:38:43,626 --> 00:38:48,918 a weird address and you're A 6,000 623 00:38:48,918 --> 00:38:51,999 you're connected to, 624 00:38:51,999 --> 00:38:54,876 and then be more subtle. 625 00:38:58,167 --> 00:38:59,792 Finally, mitigation. 626 00:39:00,334 --> 00:39:04,876 The problem is we have to sacrifice 627 00:39:04,876 --> 00:39:09,292 to mitigate this (Laughter.) Yes, 628 00:39:09,834 --> 00:39:14,626 The leaks are at every level 629 00:39:14,626 --> 00:39:16,083 I do mean every, single level. 630 00:39:16,083 --> 00:39:19,334 The bottom layer, 631 00:39:19,334 --> 00:39:24,542 of networks is an acceptable way 632 00:39:24,542 --> 00:39:27,918 that's a terrible idea, right? 633 00:39:27,918 --> 00:39:29,584 That's in the protocol, 634 00:39:29,584 --> 00:39:32,999 the protocol that would be 635 00:39:32,999 --> 00:39:35,999 out engineering thugs to hurt us! 636 00:39:36,584 --> 00:39:39,999 They have to fix this 637 00:39:39,999 --> 00:39:43,083 convenient to walk 638 00:39:43,083 --> 00:39:47,083 to wifi without every having to turn 639 00:39:47,083 --> 00:39:50,626 to iMessage and download them 640 00:39:50,626 --> 00:39:53,999 from Anthony Wiener, I'm sure 641 00:39:53,999 --> 00:39:58,584 to be promulgate a few protocol 642 00:39:58,584 --> 00:40:02,876 Hey it's going to be less convenient 643 00:40:02,876 --> 00:40:07,999 but you should use this 644 00:40:08,626 --> 00:40:11,501 There is also a problem 645 00:40:11,792 --> 00:40:15,209 A lot of mobile operating systems, 646 00:40:15,209 --> 00:40:18,000 because that's what I use, 647 00:40:18,000 --> 00:40:21,876 so when I connect to get a new wifi 648 00:40:21,876 --> 00:40:25,334 on the VPN 649 00:40:25,334 --> 00:40:27,999 That is not possible to do on ios. 650 00:40:28,999 --> 00:40:32,334 You always have those first few 651 00:40:32,334 --> 00:40:35,083 with data 652 00:40:35,083 --> 00:40:39,999 and they're transmitting everything else 653 00:40:41,375 --> 00:40:44,167 To the o/s 2 has to be protected. 654 00:40:50,042 --> 00:40:58,000 I found an online shopping application 655 00:40:58,250 --> 00:41:00,417 It's not Groupon right? 656 00:41:00,417 --> 00:41:02,667 It's not something that involves my 657 00:41:02,667 --> 00:41:04,999 they can send me targeted ads. 658 00:41:09,083 --> 00:41:11,125 No one should have unencrypted 659 00:41:11,125 --> 00:41:14,334 to how much that new Manolo Blahnik 660 00:41:14,334 --> 00:41:17,999 but for some reason everyone 661 00:41:17,999 --> 00:41:22,542 access to what os I'm running where 662 00:41:22,542 --> 00:41:24,250 That's a pretty weird trade off. 663 00:41:24,250 --> 00:41:26,083 It's our fault, 664 00:41:26,083 --> 00:41:30,083 to protect our users, 665 00:41:30,250 --> 00:41:33,417 This is everyone's fault, so no one 666 00:41:33,417 --> 00:41:35,083 for us, right? 667 00:41:35,999 --> 00:41:39,083 It's just status quo, right? 668 00:41:39,209 --> 00:41:41,999 The status is not quo, for those 669 00:41:41,999 --> 00:41:45,876 Horrible: "We cannot tolerate this level 670 00:41:45,876 --> 00:41:47,459 Horrible fan! 671 00:41:47,626 --> 00:41:51,209 As consumers we need to do better 672 00:41:51,209 --> 00:41:53,999 to the world to do better. 673 00:41:54,417 --> 00:41:56,417 One final digression. 674 00:41:56,709 --> 00:41:59,999 At Smu Con 2013 there was 675 00:41:59,999 --> 00:42:03,125 about academics and researchers. 676 00:42:03,125 --> 00:42:05,250 I have split both in my career. 677 00:42:05,250 --> 00:42:07,334 I have an academic degree 678 00:42:07,334 --> 00:42:10,167 an academic degree in law these days, 679 00:42:10,167 --> 00:42:13,417 without any academic support most 680 00:42:13,709 --> 00:42:16,167 We need to be able to have a way 681 00:42:16,167 --> 00:42:19,751 to work together, and part 682 00:42:19,751 --> 00:42:21,999 to find a way, any way 683 00:42:21,999 --> 00:42:24,667 the same mistakes over and over. 684 00:42:24,709 --> 00:42:26,501 Everybody who has done 685 00:42:26,501 --> 00:42:28,250 project knows that you spend 686 00:42:28,250 --> 00:42:30,334 of months you do something 687 00:42:30,334 --> 00:42:34,167 of months you say, oh, God, 688 00:42:34,709 --> 00:42:38,209 Couple days ago, 689 00:42:38,209 --> 00:42:42,959 a new hacker archive that you can 690 00:42:43,334 --> 00:42:46,999 Tweets, blog post, 691 00:42:46,999 --> 00:42:49,459 We will have mentors that 692 00:42:49,459 --> 00:42:52,834 to the next level, or the next level 693 00:42:52,834 --> 00:42:56,834 the next "Woot Conference" which 694 00:42:57,999 --> 00:43:00,667 We want to be able to promote 695 00:43:00,667 --> 00:43:04,542 to have a permanent archive so people 696 00:43:04,542 --> 00:43:07,125 it will live beyond their own time, 697 00:43:07,125 --> 00:43:11,751 if we start losing hackers left and right, 698 00:43:12,083 --> 00:43:13,751 We need to "fail" better. 699 00:43:13,834 --> 00:43:15,834 In order to do that, we need your help. 700 00:43:15,834 --> 00:43:17,083 It's at HARK.net. 701 00:43:17,083 --> 00:43:19,125 where you can contribute to. 702 00:43:19,709 --> 00:43:22,167 Finally to those who have asked 703 00:43:22,167 --> 00:43:24,876 the CFT and for my law school 704 00:43:24,876 --> 00:43:27,999 to make me work on law school most 705 00:43:28,792 --> 00:43:31,792 And I'm finishing law school 706 00:43:32,792 --> 00:43:36,667 If you have an idea that you would 707 00:43:36,667 --> 00:43:39,125 an email, it's on the slide. 708 00:43:39,167 --> 00:43:41,999 Seriously, we want to be able 709 00:43:41,999 --> 00:43:44,999 not just academics' work, live forever. 710 00:43:44,999 --> 00:43:49,209 If you want to live in immortality, go 711 00:43:49,209 --> 00:43:50,209 Thanks very much. 712 00:43:50,209 --> 00:43:59,501 (Applause.) I have two minutes 713 00:44:00,999 --> 00:44:06,999 AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Away 714 00:44:06,999 --> 00:44:09,083 IP cameras? 715 00:44:09,083 --> 00:44:12,792 You could do that that's 716 00:44:13,999 --> 00:44:15,792 Repeat the question? 717 00:44:16,083 --> 00:44:19,999 The question was why don't I integrate 718 00:44:19,999 --> 00:44:22,083 and stalk from that. 719 00:44:22,083 --> 00:44:25,125 That would work you need 720 00:44:25,125 --> 00:44:28,083 of the O parsers, 721 00:44:28,083 --> 00:44:31,709 into the device which would be cool 722 00:44:31,709 --> 00:44:34,501 to bring a Raspberry Pi aboard. 723 00:44:34,834 --> 00:44:39,999 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Have you 724 00:44:39,999 --> 00:44:50,999 about using Unity ID (Away 725 00:44:50,999 --> 00:44:53,209 So the question was have I used Unity's 726 00:44:53,209 --> 00:44:56,417 the networking 727 00:44:56,417 --> 00:44:59,792 I haven't, because it's not flexible 728 00:44:59,792 --> 00:45:02,999 the way to do that would be to go 729 00:45:02,999 --> 00:45:05,709 by everybody dumping 730 00:45:05,709 --> 00:45:07,292 and tagging. 731 00:45:08,959 --> 00:45:13,709 So that capability is built in, 732 00:45:13,959 --> 00:45:15,334 Everybody else grab me, 733 00:45:15,334 --> 00:45:17,501 off stage in about 30 seconds. 734 00:45:17,501 --> 00:45:18,501 Thanks very much.