Introduction to the Witchcraft Compiler Collection

Jonathan Brossard

5th of August 2016

DEFCON 24, Las Vegas, USA
The Witchcraft Compiler Collection is free software (MIT/BSD License).

I would love you to extend it and contribute to WCC on https://github.com/endrazine/wcc

You can write in Lua, Punk-C or C.

No assembly skills required.
Who am I?
Bypassing pre-boot authentication passwords by instrumenting the BIOS keyboard buffer (practical low level attacks against x86 pre-boot authentication software)

Jonathan Brossard - jonathan@ivizindia.com

Iviz Technosolutions Pvt. Ltd., Kolkata, India

"The walls between art and engineering exist only in our minds." – Theo Jansen

Abstract. Pre-boot authentication software, in particular full hard disk encryption software, play a key role in preventing information theft[1]. In this paper, we present a new class of vulnerability affecting multiple high value pre-boot authentication software, including the latest Microsoft disk encryption technology: Microsoft Vista’s Bitlocker, with TPM chip enabled. Because Pre-boot authentication software programmers commonly make wrong assumptions about the inner workings of the BIOS interruptions responsible for handling keyboard input, they typically use the BIOS API without flushing or initializing the BIOS internal keyboard buffer. Therefore, any user input including plain text passwords remains in memory at a given physical location. In this article, we first present a detailed analysis of this new class of vulnerability and generic exploits for Windows and Unix platforms under x86 architectures. Un-
Annexe A : Non exhaustive list of software vulnerable to plain text password leakage

Vulnerable software :

BIOS passwords :

- Award BIOS Modular 4.50pg[33]
- Insyde BIOS V190[34]
- Intel Corp PE94510M.86A.0050.2007.0710.1559 (07/10/2007)
- Hewlett-Packard 68DTT Ver. F.0D (11/22/2005)
- Lenovo 7CETB5WW v2.05 (10/13/2006)

Full disk encryption with pre-boot authentication capabilities :

- Bitlocker with TPM and password based authentication enabled under Microsoft Vista Ultimate Edition
- Truecrypt 5.0 for Windows
- DiskCryptor 0.2.6 for Windows (latest)
- Secu Star DriveCrypt Plus Pack v3.9 (latest)
Hardware Backdooring is practical

Jonathan Brossard (Toucan System)

Computing

A Computer Infection that Can Never Be Cured

A hacker demonstrates that code can be hidden inside a new computer to put it forever under remote control, even after upgrades to the hard drive or operating system.

by Tom Simonite     August 1, 2012
Meet 'Rakshasa,' The Malware Infection Designed To Be Undetectable And Incurable

Malicious software, like all software, gets smarter all the time. In recent years it’s learned to destroy physical infrastructure, install itself through Microsoft updates, and use human beings as physical “data mules,” for instance. But researcher Jonathan Brossard has innovated a uniquely nasty coding trick: A strain of malware that’s nearly impossible to disinfect.

At the Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas Thursday, Brossard plans to present a paper (PDF here) on “Rakshasa,” a piece of proof-of-concept malware that aims to be a “permanent backdoor” in a PC, one that’s very difficult to detect, and even harder to remove.

A sculpture of a Rakshasa, the Hindu demon from which Jonathan Brossard’s malware experiment takes its name.
3.3 mk_fork() implementation

Previous works[14][15] have shown it was possible to use ptrace to inject an arbitrary library inside the process’ address space. We don’t need that much, we’ll just inject a small shellcode forcing the process to call fork, and start ptracing the child.

Let’s see how this can be achieved (ignoring error handling here and unnecessary complexity for the sake of clarity):

```c
/*
 *
 * force a process to fork()
 *
 * returns the pid of the offspring
 *
 */
int mk_fork(pid_t pid){

    void *target_addr;
    struct user_regs_struct regz;
    struct user_regs_struct regx;
    struct user_regs_struct regz_new;
    int status;
    siginfo_t si;
    struct w_to_x_ptr *tmp4;
    int newpid;
    int fork_ok=0,offspring_ok=0;
```
New SMB Relay Attack Steals User Credentials Over Internet

Researchers found a twist to an older vulnerability that lets them launch SMB relay attacks from the Internet.

BLACK HAT USA -- Las Vegas -- A Windows vulnerability in the SMB file-sharing protocol discovered 14 years ago and partially patched by Microsoft could still be abused via remote attacks, two security researchers demonstrated on stage at the Black Hat security conference on Wednesday.

Microsoft patched the vulnerability years ago, but it was actually a partial fix because it based the patch on the fact that the attacker must already be on the local network, said Jonathan Brossard and Hormazd Billamoria, two engineers from Salesforce.com. In their session, they demonstrated how the SMB relay attack can be launched remotely from the Internet and seize control of the targeted system.

This is the first vulnerability ever reported to affect the Edge browser

As Mr. Brossard notes, all IE versions are vulnerable, including Microsoft’s latest Edge browser, making this "the first attack against Windows 10 and its web browser Spartan."

Additionally, other vulnerable applications include Windows Media Player, Adobe Reader, Apple QuickTime, Excel 2010, Symantec’s Norton Security Scan, AVG Free, BitDefender Free, Comodo Antivirus, IntelliJ IDEA, Box Sync, GitHub for Windows, TeamViewer, and many other more.

The research paper was written before the Windows 10 launch, and obviously before Spartan was renamed to Edge.

The research also includes different mitigation techniques, but according to Mr. Brossard, the most efficient one would be to set up custom PC-level Windows Firewall settings, preventing SMB data from leaking online via specific ports, where an SMB relay can be carried out.

Researchers show how to steal Windows Active Directory credentials from the … – Computerworld

Posted on August 7, 2015 by absurdmatrix8201

This is not a real quote. The quote is a mix of different sentences, some of them are not related to the main topic.
Security Vacation Club

The Security Vacation Club award is undeniably the highest recognition of the top 1% of the security industry. Criteria to qualify for this award are as strict on the technical content as on the entertainment part. Given the incremental number of security conferences and the decremental number of interesting topics covered, the community expressed his needs of a “Guide Michelin” dedicated to research areas, conferences and much more.

Here is a list of conferences that are certified by the Security Vacation Club. If you want to apply your conference to be approved by the Security Vacation Club, send details of the conference (including the location, summary, main purpose, past key speakers and talks, etc.), why you think your conference qualify for the SVC and a small logo (height 64 pixels) of the conference to our Community Manager at msuiche(at)moonsols(dot)com. Your application will be reviewed and answered within 45 business days.

Hackito Ergo Sum

*Paris, France* - HES is a 100% hardcore technical security conference. HES is unique by its continuous outstanding technical quality, but also by its unusual freedom and spirit. HES is a 100% non profit conference, mainly supported by the /tmp/lab Parisian hackerspace and generous sponsors.

Hack In The Box

*Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Amsterdam, The Netherlands* - Some of you might remember the first HITB conference at Cititel Hotel, Kuala Lumpur back in 2003. That year HD Moore spoke about Metasploit back when it was just the Metasploit Framework. That very conference also marked the last public appearance for LSD Group aka The Hackers Who Broke Windows. Sounds like a decade ago?

H2HC

*Sao Paulo, Brazil; Cancun, Mexico* - Hackers To Hackers Conference (H2HC) é uma conferência organizada por pessoas que trabalham ou que estão diretamente envolvidas com pesquisas e desenvolvimento na área de segurança da informação, cujo principal objetivo é permitir a disseminação, discussão e a troca de conhecimento sobre segurança da informação entre os participantes e também entre as empresas envolvidas no evento.

SyScan

*Singapore, Singapore; Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam; Taipei, Taiwan; Bangkok, Thailand* - The Symposium on Security for Asia Network (SyScan) aims to be a very different security conference from the rest of the security conferences that the information security community in Asia has come to be so familiar and frustrated with. SyScan is not a product or vendor conference that is sales and marketing oriented. SyScan is a deep knowledge technical security conference. It is the aspiration of SyScan to congregate in Asia the best security experts in their various fields, to share their research, discovery and experience with all

**Nullcon Goa, which is awesome :)**
Shakacon
Honolulu, Hawaii - The number #1 conference in Hawaii.

Infiltrate
Miami, Florida - Immunity's conference.

REcon
Montreal, Canada - REcon is a computer security conference held annually in Montreal, Canada. It offers a single track of presentations over the span of three days with a focus on reverse engineering and advanced exploitation techniques.

Kiwicon
Wellington, New Zealand - Kiwicon is the fourth (or fifth - we couldn't stay sober enough at Brightstar to rate it accurately) best technical computer security conference in the Australia-Pacific region but remains triumphant as New Zealand's best (only) hacker conference. Organised by a masochistic cabal of the security community, Kiwicon attempts to bring together the commercial infosec industry, academics, students, and hobbyist hackers to discover the new, the interesting, and technologically crackin'. Nostalgia is also permitted within the clearly marked areas, or a 10 metres around metistorm and pipes' centres of gravity.

Ekoparty
Buenos Aires, Argentina - Electronic Knock Out Party - Security Conference, is a one of a kind event in South America; an annual security conference held in Buenos Aires, where security specialists from all over Latin America (and beyond) have the chance to get involved with state-of-art techniques, vulnerabilities, and tools in a relaxed environment never seen before.

ZeroNights
Moscow, Russia - ZeroNights is an international conference dedicated to the practical side of information security. ZeroNights shows new attack methods and threats, discovers new possibilities of attack and defense, and suggests out-of-the-box security solutions.

+ add your own preferred conferences around the globe here :) #NonExhaustiveList
DISCLAIMER

- My employers are not associated with this talk in any way.
- This is my personal research.
• This talk received help from the EFF.
• Warmest thank you to Nate Cardozo, Andrew Crocker and Mitch Stoltz

Free legal advising to security researchers:
https://www.eff.org/
https://www.eff.org/issues/coders/reverse-engineering-faq
WE’RE RECRUITING

Fcrnx gb bhe fravbe frphevgl UE:
Wnzrf Fnyr

wfnyr@fnyrfsbepr.pbz
uggc://jjj.yvaxrqva.pbz/va/wnzrftfnyr

Tbbq yhpz!
AGENDA

- Motivation
- WCC components
- “Libifying” a binary
- Unlinking binaries
- Crossing a Fish and a Rabbit
- Introduction to Witchcraft
- Binary “reflection” without a VM
- Towards binary self awareness
- Future work
MOTIVATION

Prerequisites: A binary you have the right to reverse engineer. No source code.

Case studies:
1) You would like to verify the results of a static analysis
2) You know a way to crash an application but don’t want to work on the entire binary (eg: remote fuzzing).

Let’s work on the ELF 64b version of smbserver-1.5.32.
A risk score above 80 / 100 signals good risk management and typically results in cheaper software maintenance as well as increased security and user privacy.

Toucan’s score range is between 0 and 100. There is a great variety of risk score models with several score ranges because different vendors may require custom scoring models when assessing your risk score. Vendors use varying score models with different score ranges to help guide their decision on determining your security position.

`smbserver-1.5.32.tgz`
the target operating system is recent, whether the compiler in use is recent enough, whether the binary has valid or corrupted section headers, whether it is packed/encrypted or whether it has a valid digital signature all impact the metric.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPU</th>
<th>AMD x86-64 architecture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABI</td>
<td>UNIX System V ABI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPILATION DATE</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPILER</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1.2. Exploit mitigation features: 3 / 10

Exploit mitigation features are special code fragments generated by the toolchain when compiling source code into a binary. They make the resulting binary more resilient against vulnerabilities and make exploitation of vulnerabilities when they do occur much more difficult and even provably impossible in certain cases. This metric estimates on a scale from 0 to 6 which exploit mitigation features are being used in the audited binary, each feature awards 1 point.

| NX  | YES |
| W*X | YES |
| aslr| NO  |
| fortify | NO |
| full relocations | NO |
| stack cookies | NO |

2.1.3. Cryptographic algorithms: 5 / 10

While using strong cryptography can guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of data when used properly, weak ciphers can lead to cryptographic attacks, resulting in breach of confidentiality and data tampering. This metric represents on a scale from 0 to 10 the strength of the algorithms used within this application. A low score reflects that at least one weak cipher is used, a high grade signifies
The binary contains 2 high score vulnerabilities and 1 high score bug.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Confidence</th>
<th>Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>CWE-120 - BUFFER OVERFLOW</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>CWE-61: UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>CWE-676 - DEPRECATED API</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>CWE-676 - DEPRECATED API</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>CWE-676 - DEPRECATED API</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bug</td>
<td>CWE-78 - COMMAND INJECTION</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The detail of those vulnerabilities is presented in section c.

![Code security chart](chart.png)
## Vulnerability

**Score:** 8  
**Impact:** 7  
**Confidence:** 10  
**Risk:** 10  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Score: 8</th>
<th>Impact: 7</th>
<th>Confidence: 10</th>
<th>Risk: 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Address</td>
<td>CWE-61: UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>function</td>
<td>00409d74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Description:**

When calling function: fopen('/tmp/jnk.close', 'w');

Temporary file creation under a publicly writable path (/tmp/) using fopen() in write mode leads to potential file truncation or overwrite via symbolic links. One could use open(..., O_CREAT|O_EXCL,...) instead to prevent those attacks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Backtrace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#00 &lt;409d74&gt; fopen('/tmp/jnk.close', 'w'); at: /smbserver:0x409d74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#01 &lt;409d2f&gt; reply_close() at: /smbserver:0x409d2f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#02 &lt;40c2c9&gt; switch_message() at: /smbserver:0x40c2c9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

## Vulnerability

**Score:** 5  
**Impact:** 2  
**Confidence:** 10  
**Risk:** 10  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Score: 5</th>
<th>Impact: 2</th>
<th>Confidence: 10</th>
<th>Risk: 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Address</td>
<td>CWE-676 - DEPRECATED API</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>function</td>
<td>00407b8d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Description:**

Vulnerability when calling function mktemp() The file name generated by mktemp(TEMPLATE-XXXXXX) is predictable on certain systems such as BSD (which replaces XXXXXX with the PID). An alternative like the mktemp() should be used instead.

Function is an obsolete function call.
## Vulnerability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score: 8</th>
<th>Impact: 7</th>
<th>Confidence: 10</th>
<th>Risk: 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td>CWE-61: UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Address</strong></td>
<td>00409d74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>function</strong></td>
<td>0040d6f0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Description**

When calling function: fopen('/tmp/jnk.close', 'w');

Temporary file creation under a publicly writable path (/tmp/) using fopen() in write mode leads to potential file truncation or overwrite via symbolic links. One could use open(...,O_CREAT|O_EXCL,...) instead to prevent those attacks.

**Backtrace**

#00 <409d74> fopen('/tmp/jnk.close', 'w'); at: ./smbserver:0x409d74
#01 <409d2f> reply_close() at: ./smbserver:0x409d2f
#02 <40c2c9> switch_message() at: ./smbserver:0x40c2c9
We have only a partial symbolic stack trace.
How to verify if this vulnerability exists?

Wouldn’t it be nice if we could call reply_close() with arbitrary arguments directly?
CASE STUDY: FUZZING

Core was generated:

Core was generated by `smbd'.
Program terminated with signal 11, Segmentation fault.
#0 0x00007f1b767f363d in _gf_log () from /usr/lib64/libglusterfs.so.0
Missing separate debuginfos, use: debuginfo-install samba-3.6.9-160.3.el6rhs.x86_64
(gdb) bt
#0 0x00007f1b767f363d in _gf_log () from /usr/lib64/libglusterfs.so.0
#1 0x00007f1b765cf6da in rpc_clnt_record_build_header () from
/usr/lib64/libgf.rpc.so.0
#2 0x00007f1b765d0096 in rpc_clnt_record_build_record () from
/usr/lib64/libgf.rpc.so.0
#3 0x00007f1b765d02f6 in rpc_clnt_record () from /usr/lib64/libgf.rpc.so.0
#4 0x00007f1b765d07c9 in rpc_clnt_submit () from /usr/lib64/libgf.rpc.so.0
#5 0x00007f1b666d8723 in client_submit_request () from
/usr/lib64/glusterfs/3.4.0.30rhs/xlator/protocol/client.so
#6 0x00007f1b666e031d in client3_3_lookup () from
/usr/lib64/glusterfs/3.4.0.30rhs/xlator/protocol/client.so
#7 0x00007f1b666d845c in client_lookup () from
/usr/lib64/glusterfs/3.4.0.30rhs/xlator/cluster/replicate.so
#8 0x00007f1b666c9e61 in afr_lookup () from
/usr/lib64/glusterfs/3.4.0.30rhs/xlator/cluster/distribute.so
#9 0x00007f1b66954638 in dht_lookup () from
/usr/lib64/glusterfs/3.4.0.30rhs/xlator/cluster/distribute.so
#10 0x00007f1b767f48ad in default_lookup () from /usr/lib64/libglusterfs.so.0
#11 0x00007f1b665164ac in ioc_lookup () from
/usr/lib64/glusterfs/3.4.0.30rhs/xlator/performance/io-cache.so
#12 0x00007f1b6630cc47 in qr_lookup () from
/usr/lib64/glusterfs/3.4.0.30rhs/xlator/performance/quick-read.so
#13 0x00007f1b665ee7608 in trace_lookup () from
/usr/lib64/glusterfs/3.4.0.30rhs/xlator/debug/trace.so
#14 0x00007f1b65ce337 in io_stats_lookup () from
/usr/lib64/glusterfs/3.4.0.30rhs/xlator/debug/io-stats.so
#15 0x00007f1b768240ea in syncop_lookup () from /usr/lib64/libglusterfs.so.0

Actual results:
The smbd crashes.

Expected results:
The glusterfs_build should run successfully.
CASE STUDY : FUZZING

We have only a partial symbolic stack trace.
This could be a worker thread (note: smbd is linked with libpthread).
I don’t want to resend new packets or restart threads when analyzing!
Bonus points if you triggered it via instrumentation/concolic execution and
don’t actually have a trigger either.
Can we verify if this vulnerability is exploitable?

Wouldn’t it be nice to call rpc_clnt_record_build_header() or any function in client.so with arbitrary arguments directly?
You can do the later with some work (exported functions from shared libraries) but in theory, not the former ever ever (function directly within a binary).

Let’s make both possible with 0 code nor reverse engineering.
Binaries (C):

wld : witchcraft linker
wcc : witchcraft core compiler
wsh : witchcraft shell : dynamic interpreter + scripting engine

Scripts (lua, ...):
wchch : witchcraft header generator
wldd : witchcraft compiler flags generator
...

Host machine : GNU/Linux x86_64 (mostly portable to POSIX systems).
WLD: “LIBIFICATION”

Transforming an ELF executable binary into an ELF shared library.
DEMOS
A word on decompiling
typedef struct
{
    unsigned char e_ident[EI_NIDENT];  /* Magic number and other info */
    Elf64_Half  e_type;               /* Object file type */
    Elf64_Half  e_machine;            /* Architecture */
    Elf64_Word  e_version;            /* Object file version */
    Elf64.Addr  e_entry;              /* Entry point virtual address */
    Elf64_Off   e_phoff;              /* Program header table file offset */
    Elf64_Off   e_shoff;              /* Section header table file offset */
    Elf64_Word  e_flags;              /* Processor-specific flags */
    Elf64_Half  e_ehsize;             /* ELF header size in bytes */
    Elf64_Half  e_phentsize;          /* Program header table entry size */
    Elf64_Half  e_phnum;              /* Program header table entry count */
    Elf64_Half  e_shentsize;          /* Section header table entry size */
    Elf64_Half  e_shnum;              /* Section header table entry count */
    Elf64_Half  e_shstrndx;           /* Section header string table index */
} Elf64_Ehdr;
DEMOS
Libification of proftpd
LIBIFICATION OF PROFTPD

```
jonathan@blackbox:~$ cp /usr/sbin/proftpd /tmp/
jonathan@blackbox:~$ file /tmp/proftpd |grep --color executable
/tmp/proftpd: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.15, BuildID[sha1]=30912def5c08318424e43362f5b5f17a72c26a59, stripped
jonathan@blackbox:~$ wld -libify /tmp/proftpd
jonathan@blackbox:~$ file /tmp/proftpd |grep --color "shared object"
/tmp/proftpd: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.15, BuildID[sha1]=30912def5c08318424e43362f5b5f17a72c26a59, stripped
jonathan@blackbox:~$
jonathan@blackbox:~$
jonathan@blackbox:~$ /tmp/proftpd --version
ProFTPD Version 1.3.3d
jonathan@blackbox:~$
```
WE REALLY PATCHED 1 BYTE ONLY
We’re really creating a “non relocatable” shared library.

ET_DYN and ET_EXEC ELF files are both executable (ASLR support in the kernel)

This is equivalent to creating a shared library with a non NULL base address (equivalent to prelinking)

Note: Amazingly, this shared library is still a valid executable too.
DEMOS
Linking against apache2
APACHE2 AS A SHARED LIBRARY

```bash
jonathan@blackbox:~/defcon2016/apache$ ccat Makefile
CC := gcc
CFLAGS := -W -Wall
LDFLAGS := /usr/sbin/apache2

all::
  $(CC) $(CFLAGS) ap2version.c -o ap2version $(LDFLAGS)
jonathan@blackbox:~/defcon2016/apache$ ccat ap2version.c
/**
 * Calling ap_get_server_banner() from /usr/sbin/apache2
 * endrazine for Defcon 24 // August 2016
*/
#include <stdio.h>

void *ap_get_server_banner();

int main (void)
{
    printf("Server banner: \e[31m%s\e[0m\n", ap_get_server_banner());
    return 0;
}
jonathan@blackbox:~/defcon2016/apache$ ./ap2version
Server banner: Apache/2.4.7
jonathan@blackbox:~/defcon2016/apache$
```
```
jonathan@blackbox:~/$ defcon2016/apache
jonathan@blackbox:~/$ defcon2016/apache$ ldd ./ap2version
    linux-vdso.so.1 =>  (0x00007ffe9a37a400)
    /usr/sbin/apache2 (0x00007f501a033000)
    libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007f5019c6e000)
    libpcre.so.3 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpcre.so.3 (0x00007f5019a30000)
    libaprutil-1.so.0 => /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libaprutil-1.so.0 (0x00007f5019809000)
    libapr-1.so.0 => /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libapr-1.so.0 (0x00007f50195d0000)
    libpthread.so.0 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0 (0x00007f50193ba000)
    /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007f501a2d2000)
    libcrypt.so.1 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypt.so.1 (0x00007f5019181000)
    libexpat.so.1 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libexpat.so.1 (0x00007f5018f57000)
    libuuid.so.1 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libuuid.so.1 (0x00007f5018d52000)
    libdl.so.2 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libdl.so.2 (0x00007f5018b4e000)
jonathan@blackbox:~/$ defcon2016/apache$
```
The typical approach to reverse engineering is to transform binaries or shared libraries back to source code.

Instead, we aim at transforming final binaries or shared libraries back to ELF relocatable objects, that can later be relinked normally (using gcc/ld) into executables or shared objects.

This binary refactoring is enough to “reuse” (steal) binary functions without any disassembly. This is no longer true: some relocations require some disassembly. We used the capstone disassembly library to perform this.
WCC: "UNLINKING"

Source code ➔ Compiler ➔ Relocatable objects (*.o) ➔ Linker ➔ Binaries (executables, shared libs...)

Diagram showing the process of compiling source code into relocatable objects and then linking those objects to create binararies.
WCC: "UNLINKING"

Source code → Compiler → Relocatable objects (*.o) → Linker → Binaries (executables, shared libs...) → Decompiler
WCC: “UNLINKING”

Source code → Compiler → Relocatable objects (*.o) → Linker → Binaries (executables, shared libs...)

Decompiler
UNLINKING

Source code → Compiler → Relocatable objects (*.o) → Linker → Binaries (executables, shared libs…)

Decompiler

Unlinking is the process of transforming relocatable objects into non-relocatable objects (binaries). It involves linking the relocatable objects together, which may also include linking with shared libraries.
The command line is made to resemble the syntax of gcc:

```
Usage: ./wcc [options] file
```

```
options:
    -o, --output <output file>
    -E, --entrypoint <0xaddress>
    -m, --mode <mode>
    -i, --interpreter <Interpreter>
    -p, --poison <poison>
    -h, --help
    -s, --shared
    -c, --compile
    -S, --static
    -x, --strip
    -X, --ssstrip
    -e, --exec
    -C, --core
    -O, --original
    -v, --verbose
    -V, --version
```

The front end is build around libbfd. The backend is trivial C to copy each mapped section of the binary, handle symbols and relocations.

**Benefit of using libbfd:** the input binary doesn’t need to be an ELF!

=> We can for instance transform a Win64 executable into ELF 64b relocatable objects…
DEMO
(Binary to object file to relocatable to unstripped library)
WCC : DEMO

```
jonathan@blackbox:~/wcc/bin$ file /usr/sbin/proftpd
/usr/sbin/proftpd: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.15, BuildID[sha1]=30912def5c08318424e43362f5b5f17a72c26a59, stripped
jonathan@blackbox:~/wcc/bin$ ./wcc /usr/sbin/proftpd -o /tmp/proftpd.o -c
first loadable segment at: 40d000
  -- patching base load address of first PT_LOAD Segment: 40d770  -->  40d000
jonathan@blackbox:~/wcc/bin$ file /tmp/proftpd.o
/tmp/proftpd.o: ELF 64-bit LSB relocatable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), stripped
jonathan@blackbox:~/wcc/bin$ gcc /tmp/proftpd.o -o /tmp/proftpd.so -shared -g3 -ggdb
jonathan@blackbox:~/wcc/bin$ file /tmp/proftpd.so
/tmp/proftpd.so: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, BuildID[sha1]=09ecb2d1daa1d7c45e0429b3b19cd2d728d430c5, not stripped
jonathan@blackbox:~/wcc/bin$ 
```
DEMO
(Crossing a Fish and a Rabbit)
PE + ELF = PELF
WCC: PE32 TO ELF64

```
jonathan@blackbox:~/wcc/bin$ file /tmp/chrome.exe
/tmp/chrome.exe: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
jonathan@blackbox:~/wcc/bin$ ./wcc -c /tmp/chrome.exe -o /tmp/chrome.o
bfd_get_dynamic_symtab_upper_bound: Invalid operation
first loadable segment at: 400000
-- patching base load address of first PT_LOAD Segment: 400400 --> 400000
jonathan@blackbox:~/wcc/bin$ file /tmp/chrome.o
/tmp/chrome.o: ELF 64-bit LSB relocatable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), stripped
jonathan@blackbox:~/wcc/bin$ gcc /tmp/chrome.o -o /tmp/chrome.so -shared -g3 -ggdb
jonathan@blackbox:~/wcc/bin$ file /tmp/chrome.so
/tmp/chrome.so: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, BuildID[sha1]=ea8ff1f1505af956d5826316d1d5d8d735c4a9c3, not stripped
jonathan@blackbox:~/wcc/bin$ 
```
DEMO
Native OpenBSD on linux
WITCHCRAFT
(Punk-C/Punxic)
Lua Interpreter + “Reflected” C API = Punk-C
INTRODUCTION TO WITCHCRAFT
Now that we know how to transform arbitrary binaries into shared libraries, we can load them into our address space via dlopen(). Let’s implement the same features as traditional virtual machines, but for raw binaries!

**Whish list:**
- Load arbitrary applications into memory
- Execute arbitrary functions with any arguments (and get results)
- Monitor/Trace execution
- Automated functions prototyping/annotation
- Learn new behavior
- Examine/Modify arbitrary memory
Loading is done via dlopen().
The core engine/shell is built around lua.
Can be compiled with luajit to get JIT compilation.
Tracing/Memory analysis doesn’t rely on ptrace() : we share the address space.
Lightweight : ~5k lines of C.
No disassembler (as of writing. Subject to change).
No need for /proc support !
Function names mapped in each library is dumped from the link_map cache.
WSH : THE WICHCRAFT
INTERPRETER

Distinctive features:

- We fully share the address space with analyzed applications (no ptrace() nor context switches).
- Requires no privileges/capabilities (no root, no ptrace(), no CAP_PTRACE, no /proc…)
- No disassembly : fully portable (POSIX)
- Implements “reflection” for binaries
- Full featured programming language
- Interactive and/or fully scriptable, autonomous programs
  - Has no types
  - Has no fixed API : any function you load in memory becomes available in WSH
  - Functions have no prototypes
=> Can call arbitrary functions without knowing their prototypes
=> Allows for extended function annotations (to be fully automated)
=> Steal/Reuse any code. Add scripting to any application.

NONE OF THIS IS SUPPOSED TO WORK
Advanced features:
- Loads any code via dlopen() : this solves relocations, symbols resolution, dependencies for us.
- Secondary loader bfd based (could load invalid binaries, anything in memory).
- Dumping of dynamic linker cash internals (undocumented) : linkmap
- Breakpoints without int 0x03 (use SIGINVALID + invalid opcode)
- Bruteforcing of mapped memory pages via msync() (0day, no /proc needed)
- Wsh can be compiled to do JIT compilation on the fly at runtime.
- Automated fuzzing/extended prototyping/functional testing

NONE OF THIS IS SUPPOSED TO WORK
WITCHCRAFT
DEMO
TOWARDS BINARY SELF AWARENESS
Consciousness 1.0
“Self-awareness is the capacity for introspection and the ability to recognize oneself as an individual separate from the environment and other individuals.”


“Consciousness is the state or quality of awareness, or, of being aware of an external object or something within oneself. It has been defined as: sentience, awareness, subjectivity, the ability to experience or to feel, wakefulness, having a sense of selfhood, and the executive control system of the mind.”

WITCHCRAFT
Numerical solutions
WITCHCRAFT
FUTURE WORK
- Hyde our own presence better in memory (second heap)
- Remote debugging, running process injection
- Shadow mapping, internal libraries tracing (recursive ltrace)
- ltrace/strace to valid scripts
- system call tracing
TO BE CONTINUED

Questions?