00:00:00.000,00:00:05.005
>>Audio's good? >>Yes >>Okay so
I'm 3AlarmLampScooter and uh
today I'm giving a talk on DIY

00:00:07.374,00:00:11.612
Nukeproofing so, show of hands
real quick, anyone here try to
come to this talk last year?

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Anyone? Anyone? We've got a few
okay. Anyone spotted as a fed in
the spot the fed panel that uh

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replaced this talk last year?
[chuckle] Okay guess no one's
that brave. So anyways [chuckle]

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ah got a little, a little
background radiation I guess
you'd say as far as uh

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motivations for this. I
originally submitted this talk
to CFP uh with some outstanding

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questions as to what exactly
that I could and couldn't
discuss uh there was actually

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some information in this talk
that was pretty previously
classified but has since been

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published in an open access
journal and uh I couldn't- I
couldn't deliver that content

00:00:45.879,00:00:50.250
last year as it had not yet been
published and uh now I'm you
know not afraid of ending up in

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getmode to discuss it that info
specifically is uh third
generation laser isotope

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separation technology. In
addition to that unfortunately
there was some tritium

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implicitly imported for the
black badges last year and uh
also I was warned you know,

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don't- don't get caught up in
that. So I guess that's- that's
a little bit about background.

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I'm really trying to keep this
fast 'cause we've only got like
what? Ten minutes or whatever.

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Anyways, so we're just going to
talk about physics a little bit
uh as we move into DIY

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Nukeproofing. Uh there's kind of
more fear uncertainty and doubt
surrounding nuclear weapons than

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uh perhaps any other technology
out there especially their
hypothetical capabilities in

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electronic warfare, of course
Defcon is a computer security
conference and nuclear weapons

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and fortunately for the most
part have not done much physical
damage in the last seven decades

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outside of some cold war
accidents however Defcon did
originally stand for defense

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condition and I think it's a
valuable form to look at how the
confluence of factors in

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technologies are uh causing what
you can basically refer to as a
changing threat landscape on the

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nuclear side. Uh so to really
brock the gestalt of nuclear
weapons and the threat landscape

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that has been there in the past
uh we kind of have to go back to
a little quick remedial physical

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lesson you've got uh two
different main isotopes of
Uranium and Uranium two thirty-

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[audience shouting] >>It's
really hard to understand >>Okay
let me try and speak up a little

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bit more, so we're gonna have a
uh like a ninety second remedial
physics lesson here if my

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microphone could work properly
[laugh] we've got two different
isotopes of Uranium that are

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kind of important to all this,
one of them is Uranium 235 the
other is Uranium 238 they uh

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differ by three neutrons and
that is why they have different
mass and uh a kind of the real

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short version of this- I had a
lot more prepared- but you can
use what's called the kinetic

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isotope effect to separate uh
the hi- uh the lighter from the
heavier uranium and uh the

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lighter uranium 235 actually is
what's called fissile material,
if you hit it with a neutron it

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can sustain a nuclear reaction
if it's enriched above around
five percent usually unless it's

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a you know pressurized light
water reactor uh anyways the uh
the heavier uranium isotope is

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much more stable, has about four
and a half billion year half
life whereas the uh lighter

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uranium isotopes about seven
hundred million years and uh if
you manage to get about a fifty

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seven kilogram ball of this
lighter isotope separated out of
the heavy stuff that's naturally

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occurring at ninety nine point
seven er sorry ninety nine point
three percent. Naturally uranium

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you can uh you can actually make
a- a physics package as they
euphemistically call uh a

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nuclear weapons uh with again
about fifty seven kilograms as a
minimum uh for the 235 content

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uh interestingly uh uranium 238
is also not just a nerd filler
you can actually hit it with a

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neutron and it will undergo a
transmutation to plutonium 239
which is also fissile material

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actually has about a uh ten
kilogram critical mass that
translates to about the size of

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a baseball uh but you need a
nuclear reactor that's running
to do that, so that is a very

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difficult thing for a anything
but a really a nation state
actor to do whereas as I'll get

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to this uh U235 route to uh a
physics package is becoming more
practical for a potential

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proliferator. So moving on a
little bit more uh we kind of
had the original proliferation

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was uh was really the United
States in Manhattan project back
around World War two and I

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really again won't touch on too
much here I'll just try and go
with the very basics but kind of

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the one on the uh the device on
the right there was called Fat
Man that was a plutonium

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implosion style device again you
need a nuclear reactor to build
that uh pretty difficult to come

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up with the plutonium uh you
also need explosive lensing
because plutonium is uh

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naturally liable to kind of go
off ahead of time whereas
uranium isn't uh you need to

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slam several pieces of the
plutonium together at a very
high speed and that's also

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something that's non trivial
with explosives engineering. The
one on the left uh Little Boy

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which was dropped on uh
Hiroshima versus Fat Man was
dropped on uh on Nagasaki uh the

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one on the left is much much
easier to build uh again as I'll
get to because of third

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generation laser light strip
separation uh so moving on again
real quick and I'm skipping over

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so much content but I want to
get into essentially the USSR
you know Soviet Russia at the

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time- ripped off uh the US'
design they had a spy named
Klaus Fuchs in Manhattan

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project, he turned over a lot of
diagrams and uh information on
the US' army in the Manhattan

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project over to the Rosenbergs
who were subsequently
electrocuted for their spying by

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the US and uh then the USSR made
uh RDS-1 or Stalin's Jet Engine
and that kind of really got the

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Cold War into uh into over drive
you could say um So anyways
moving on from there uh there

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was of course further R and D in
nuclear weapons and this is
honestly not super duper

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relevant to the presentation
either, there were what were
called teller-ulam devices which

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is where you have a nuclear
fusion reaction going on near a
fission reaction and uh again

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that actually requires a
hydrogen isotope called tritium
it's quite rare and there have

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not been any big breakthroughs
recently in in producing er uh
er in uh separating tritium out

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from regular hydrogen so that's
again not super duper relevant
other than you know the largest

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fireworks out there essentially
try- tsar bomba was uh weighed
over fifty megaton detonation

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that the USSR did. Uh so moving
on again [chuckle] uh there were
a lot of other countries that

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you know proliferated and uh
there was the UK, France, China,
India, Pakistan, etc. I kind of

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call them all the nuclear also
rans. Most of them didn't do
anything to uh necessarily

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innovative uh but one of the big
exceptions to that which was
interesting from a strategy

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perspective, and I'll get into
strategy a get- uh again in a
second is uh Israel, and they've

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officially maintained nuclear
ambiguity uh supposedly they
might have set off a nuke in

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1979 called the- the Vela
incident somewhere in the uh
[whistles] you know exact se-

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but anyways the Vela incident in
nine- 1979 was supposedly a test
of theirs but they don't confirm

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or deny that they have nuclear
weapons so all outside sources
have that kind of graph on the

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right there as a uh as a
probability distribution of how
much plutonium they likely have

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with yeah know low end there and
the uh five hundred kilogram
range and a high end in the nine

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hundred kilogram range and
that's uh that's kind of that
and then on the left you kind of

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see this graph of uh you know
the stock pile of the world over
time. In the US and USSR were

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essentially engaged in uh kind
of deadlock race to try and get
the most nuclear weapons up

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until there was a change in
strategy that I'll get to in a
second and then that kind of

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came down and then over time you
had these other countries
emerging and uh and also joining

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the nuclear club. So here are
three people who I think were
really central to kind of that

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graph we saw previously. The uh
the first one is John von
Neumann and the really

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interesting thing that he did is
he came up with what was called
mutually assured destruction

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which was sort of the idea that
as long as you've got two super
powers that are perpetually

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locked in a uh you know a cold
war essentially that they will
never nuke each other because

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they're afraid of getting blown
up by the other. And uh he kind
of said you know the only way

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you can keep a a strategy like
that going is you have to have a
massive response of being able

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to obliterate the other side no
limited response of just you
know tit for tat uh and that was

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a a bit of a interesting
strategy at the time fortunately
nuclear war obviously never

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happened but one of the guys who
was really uh instrumental in
changing that strategy and I'd

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say led to a lot of those
stockpile eruptions over time
was Herman Kahn and he argued uh

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rather controversially in his
book on thermonuclear war which
was rather famously parodied by

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Stanley Kubrick's as Dr.
Strangelove uh the concept of
winability which is

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controversial though I wouldn't
say he looked as much of that as
uh as really you know how you

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can make it a little more
survivable uh and what he
essentially concluded and he

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quite controversial was an
extensive fortification anti
ballistic missile and related

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and defense technologies uh were
not the only way of looking at a
massive retaliatory response or

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as he called it a 'wargasm' you
could uh end up having a
tremendous amount of over

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targeting where mass gallons of
you know pointing a dozen
warheads at a hot dog stand at

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the pentagon or vice versa. Uh
but his thinking was certainly
heard in Moscow too they

00:08:48.728,00:08:53.299
excavated M2 a second
clandestine subway for uh soviet
leadership, Kennedy also looked

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at uh a bunker at one point too
but that was never built under
Washington um and then the third

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guy on the right there is quite
interesting uh Abdul Qadeer Khan
and he was essentially the first

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state agnostic uh proliferator
of nuclear technology and he
pretty much just spread it

00:09:08.114,00:09:11.885
around everywhere- I won't get
into too much but he uh was
called the father of Pakistan's

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nuclear program but he really
proliferated to a lot of other
countries including North Korea,

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Iran and he he originally worked
for Uranko in the Netherlands
and he developed a non proved

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version of uh Centrifuge to
separate out uranium and then he
just went and dealt it

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essentially to the highest
bidder [chuckle] uh so let's
move on again uh yes so one of

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the big things- my slides are a
little off of work here
[chuckle] uh but one of the big

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things really with reexamining
this threat model uh is not
necessarily looking at mu- as

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much as a uh full out nuclear
wars perhaps um maybe an EMP uh
EMP event and that is something

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that was learned to a large
degree during US testing ah back
in 50s and 60s there was the uh

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the starprish- starfish prime
shot which took out about uh a
third of the satellites uh

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orbiting the planet at the time
and this was uh you know well up
into the exosphere this is not a

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detonation down near the ground
and uh what it does essentially
is it ionizes the plasma in the

00:10:10.210,00:10:15.348
upper atmosphere, ionizes the
gas in the upper atmosphere into
plasma and uh that leads to a

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compton current where a very
large amount of electrons are
all coming downward and then you

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have relatively broadband
radiation down from the very low
frequency ELF side all the way

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up to uh you know a mid range
microwave if you up to a few
gigahertz uh all projected by

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the CNP of course this would be
a quite catastrophic potentially
to electronics if you see a map

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here of just a an EMP over South
Dakota you know a few hundred
miles up you can have voltage

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strengths of you know five
thousand to fifty thousand volts
per meter in some of these bands

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you know the red one there is
fifty thousand the uh kind of
turquoise ish is is more of five

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thousand and uh you know
obviously you need schuling for
that so this is something that

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US government and military has
been pretty proactive about ever
since the starfish prime test

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but the civilian sectors really
been lagging behind and uh oh my
goodness I'm running out of time

00:11:06.266,00:11:12.405
already let me run into this
much longer uh I guess the
[inaudible] are out anyways

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[chuckle] uh so when you think
about a uh this proportionate
risk for high altitude for EMP

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uh you really think of maybe a
non state actor more even than
necessarily a state wanting to

00:11:22.815,00:11:26.619
do something like this I mean it
would be a tremendously
devastating attack from an

00:11:26.619,00:11:33.493
economic perspective- I'm
waiting for a hook any minute by
the way uh but uh oh dear uh

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yeah in terms of a hypothetical
day to day life post EMP really
the industries would be hardest

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hit is anything that relies on a
just in time supply chain so in
terms of goods and services,

00:11:43.136,00:11:47.607
anything uh could be uh very
homogenous you know availability
from area to area uh most

00:11:47.607,00:11:54.314
internet backend providers are
pretty EMP hard in this day and
age and some of them uh can be a

00:11:54.314,00:11:59.686
little more forward thinking
even in commercial data centers
uh of course uh a lot of devices

00:11:59.686,00:12:04.891
would survive that are just very
small because there is a uh kind
of upper limit on the

00:12:04.891,00:12:08.861
frequencies that this EMP puts
out and as I said that's the
gigahurtz so if you have a small

00:12:08.861,00:12:13.099
enough device that doesn't
really behave like an antennae
anymore and if it's not plugged

00:12:13.099,00:12:18.271
into you know a large power line
which is maybe resonating at say
uh you know somewhere extremely

00:12:18.271,00:12:23.409
low frequency range and if that
device is more likely to
survive. Uh then you know you

00:12:23.409,00:12:28.982
might just well we haven't had
an EMP attack in over the last
half century in which we've

00:12:28.982,00:12:33.486
known about these effects, is it
really something to be concerned
over? And I'd say some concern's

00:12:33.486,00:12:38.324
reasonable but certainly not
panic uh however the interesting
thing I'm going to get to if I

00:12:38.324,00:12:44.731
can get this video up here in
one second [chuckle] uh is this
new uranium uh separation

00:12:44.731,00:12:49.736
technology. It's in the video-
videos folder here and uh this
uh the CEO of Silex systems

00:12:52.438,00:12:57.443
actually uh explains the uh
explains it quite well. If we
can hear. Do we have audio? I

00:13:09.989,00:13:14.994
guess we might not have audio
here. Oh dear. Okay well I guess
we're not getting uh audio on

00:13:18.097,00:13:23.036
our videos for now so we'll just
go ahead and skip over but
basically this guy says that

00:13:23.036,00:13:29.208
they build this uh great new
laser enrichment technology in
uh in Australia and this indeed

00:13:29.208,00:13:33.179
uh has been ongoing for the last
couple decades, and then
surprisingly there is a wild

00:13:33.179,00:13:37.016
proliferation assessment a lot
of people have been calling for
a proliferation assessment of

00:13:37.016,00:13:41.721
third generation laser isotope
separation and one came out it
was published by a postdoc at

00:13:41.721,00:13:46.526
princeton named Ryan Snyder and
uh he essentially said you know
it looks like this is pretty

00:13:46.526,00:13:50.596
sim- carbon dioxide laser
technology they've probably
started working on carbon

00:13:50.596,00:13:55.735
monoxide laser technology and
that the uh possibility exists
that such a system could be

00:13:55.735,00:14:00.206
indigenously assembled which is
kind of just code for saying
this is not a very hard thing to

00:14:00.206,00:14:05.344
build like you could get your
hands on uranium in theory and
uh enriching it would would

00:14:05.344,00:14:09.382
really no longer be a huge
undertaking of nation states
making centrifusion spending a

00:14:09.382,00:14:14.854
lot- you know tens of thousands
of RPM that's really no longer
necessary with uh just gas laser

00:14:14.854,00:14:18.691
technology I mean we're talking
relatively simple things you can
build out, marks generators

00:14:18.691,00:14:23.362
which are made out of capacitors
and spark caps are stalled so it
switches and uh and that's

00:14:23.362,00:14:27.900
really kind of you know
switching things up because you
don't need that huge capital

00:14:27.900,00:14:32.472
investment and a lot of non
state actors may be able to
indigenously proliferate in the

00:14:32.472,00:14:37.910
future and uh that's why I think
we may be looking at kind of a
future of arms control failure

00:14:37.910,00:14:42.448
at least from the perspective of
being able to stop enrichment
because it's difficult to pick

00:14:42.448,00:14:48.621
up somebody making uh laser
isotope separation setup versus
a medical laser or you know just

00:14:48.621,00:14:53.893
anything that needs a lot of
pulse capacitors for example uh
so as much as I hate to agree

00:14:53.893,00:14:59.132
with Donald Trump on the issue
of nuclear arms control I I
think totality of the evidence

00:14:59.132,00:15:03.736
may point to uh being kinda
shoot [inaudible] for lack of a
better term. Granted there is uh

00:15:03.736,00:15:07.006
great progress elsewhere in our
arms control like the Newsford
experiment for remotely

00:15:07.006,00:15:12.912
detecting uh isotope signatures
operating nuclear reactors um
most arms control has really

00:15:12.912,00:15:18.084
been more around policy of
restricting enrichment but again
that's really going to be a lot

00:15:18.084,00:15:24.423
harder with uh with this Silex
process being reverse engineered
now. In terms of locating a

00:15:24.423,00:15:29.462
clandestine proliferation
facility uh turns out you only
need about seventy two hundred

00:15:29.462,00:15:35.067
kilograms of uh uranium ore in
order to proliferate and the
facility might fit within about

00:15:35.067,00:15:38.871
two hundred square meters so
this this could be very
challenging there really haven't

00:15:38.871,00:15:43.576
been too many good intelligent
solutions out there yet for this
Uh in addition to the

00:15:43.576,00:15:47.713
comparatively low upfront
capital expenditures the ability
to indigenously assemble laser

00:15:47.713,00:15:51.184
enrichment facilities really
presents a significant
operational security advantage

00:15:51.184,00:15:56.222
for a proliferator versus uh a
say probing an existing supply
chain to find an X to AQ con

00:15:56.222,00:16:01.360
because you'll need centrifuges.
Uh in terms of building a
realistic future of threat model

00:16:01.360,00:16:05.198
for a potential asymmetric
nuclear reactors I think
stepping back into the annuls of

00:16:05.198,00:16:09.202
civilian misadventure with
energetic materials is really
warranted, I mean you can say

00:16:09.202,00:16:13.439
for every you know Timothy
McVader ten thousand Jason
Pierre-Paul's who blow their

00:16:13.439,00:16:18.077
finger off with fireworks
[chuckle] for lack of a better
analogy and I think you probably

00:16:18.077,00:16:23.149
see a lot of similar things if
there's uh indeed a a surge in
nuclear proliferation in the

00:16:23.149,00:16:26.853
future you may see a lot of
accidents by would be
proliferators before you see

00:16:26.853,00:16:31.858
anything that actually uh know
comes to fruition uh you know in
the moral words of Boris Baranov

00:16:34.160,00:16:39.498
you can't make an omelet without
breaking some eggs pooksy
[laugh] so really in terms of

00:16:39.498,00:16:44.203
what to do with it you know like
I said I think the high altitude
EMP uh is really the you know

00:16:44.203,00:16:49.075
kind of the most likely threat
model given the really
disproportionate uh kind of

00:16:49.075,00:16:54.513
effect it can have on a whole
society versus you know maybe
you can affect a few square

00:16:54.513,00:17:00.653
miles with a ground detonation,
you can affect a country with a,
a high altitude EMP, uh and

00:17:00.653,00:17:04.423
believe it or not shielding is
actually not that difficult you
know you look at like a picture

00:17:04.423,00:17:08.728
of the Cheyenne mountain complex
well that was designed to
survive a five megaton direct

00:17:08.728,00:17:13.399
strike uh granted it's even
deprecated now 'cause there are
precise enough missiles to hit

00:17:13.399,00:17:17.803
it over and over and over again
are held by nation states but
when you think about just kind

00:17:17.803,00:17:22.575
of a pop shot coming in and you
know exploding at a high
altitude believe it or not

00:17:22.575,00:17:27.213
something like a trashcan can
give you you know forty or fifty
decibels of shielding if you

00:17:27.213,00:17:31.651
tape it up properly so it
doesn't act as a slot antennae
and let alone you know steel

00:17:31.651,00:17:35.788
culverts, drainage pipes, uh
there are really a tremendous
amount of options as far as

00:17:35.788,00:17:39.325
shielding goes the important
thing is just the inside of the
shielding it has to be non

00:17:39.325,00:17:44.330
electrically conductive whereas
the shielding itself has to be
electrically conductive and then

00:17:44.330,00:17:49.201
uh very large devices are going
to also need magnetic shielding
in addition to just conductive

00:17:49.201,00:17:54.473
electric shielding. So I decided
to look at you know some
different options for this and

00:17:54.473,00:18:00.479
uh you know you can obviously go
small like trash can or whatever
or go ahead and actually you

00:18:00.479,00:18:06.385
know purpose build a hardening
facility and that's where I
looked at uh Mil STD 188 1251

00:18:06.385,00:18:10.690
high altitude magnetic pulse
protection- oh we got time?
>>We're done >>Okay, shoot

00:18:13.192,00:18:17.029
>>Okay, Thank you! [Applause]
>>Okay thanks a lot [laughs]