00:00:00.367,00:00:03.837 >>Good morning everyone. >>Good morning. Whoo hoo. >>I see most 00:00:03.837,00:00:08.008 of DEF CON is not here today because, it is Saturday morning. 00:00:08.008,00:00:11.845 I kinda expected that. So. Welcome to: "I Fight for the 00:00:11.845,00:00:16.817 Users - Episode 1: Attacks Against Top Consumer Products". 00:00:16.817,00:00:22.122 I'm Zack, >>I'm Erin >>this is Erin, she's SecBarbie and we 00:00:22.122,00:00:23.690 always like to start with a slide of what our credentials 00:00:23.690,00:00:29.029 are. We like to always say: don't trust a speaker just 00:00:29.029,00:00:30.898 ‘cause they are up here. Trust them ‘cause you validate what 00:00:30.898,00:00:33.500 they're saying. So, instead of having a long list of 00:00:33.500,00:00:36.737 certifications, things we do, we like to say judge us for 00:00:36.737,00:00:38.939 everything else. >>We're pretty smart though. >>So before we get 00:00:38.939,00:00:42.342 started, uh, it's Erin's first time speaking at DEF CON [crowd 00:00:45.112,00:00:47.180 cheers] and we've been informed that goons are no longer d- 00:00:47.180,00:00:52.653 allowed to do shots with first time speakers >>Boo! [crown 00:00:52.653,00:00:55.923 boos] >>So this is Erin's way of, uh, celebrating, 00:00:55.923,00:01:00.961 congratulations Erin >>I brought a shot. [applause] >>You want 00:01:00.961,00:01:04.665 the other one? >>Alright, alright, so, before we get 00:01:04.665,00:01:08.201 started and in all seriousness this is our, our con speaker 00:01:08.201,00:01:11.505 rule 101 so, both Zack and myself have been around this 00:01:11.505,00:01:16.209 game a few, few years and what we see persistently, is 00:01:16.209,00:01:20.314 companies go out and they, they love to use these conferences as 00:01:20.314,00:01:23.617 great PR hooks so I want to start out apologizing to every 00:01:23.617,00:01:26.586 single news media outlet that reached out to us but we learned 00:01:26.586,00:01:30.090 really quickly, years ago, that as soon as you start dropping 00:01:30.090,00:01:33.160 information - especially when you have things like "consumer 00:01:33.160,00:01:38.999 product", "IoT" - your talk will get pulled right away. So, 00:01:38.999,00:01:40.867 you've heard probably very little about what we're going to 00:01:40.867,00:01:45.272 talk about but we hope to excite you with a few, uh, I don't know 00:01:45.272,00:01:47.808 names… we're not being very vague today… >> No we're not. 00:01:47.808,00:01:54.481 >>so, welcome to DEF CON [inaudible] >>So, what we're 00:01:54.481,00:01:57.217 kinda covering three different topics today. First is we're 00:01:57.217,00:01:59.753 going to talk about, or I'll talk about Bluetooth, uh, some 00:01:59.753,00:02:02.189 fun things with that for Bluetooth low energy. Uh, Erin's 00:02:02.189,00:02:04.424 going to be talking about some wireless security products, um 00:02:04.424,00:02:06.360 especially on the camera side ... >>Whoo hoo >>... and then 00:02:06.360,00:02:09.930 I'll also talk about on uh, Windows security side, some fun 00:02:09.930,00:02:12.232 things we found on there. So, you may be like, this is a 00:02:12.232,00:02:15.202 little ADD this seems a little odd-ball to be jumping all over 00:02:15.202,00:02:20.107 the place, uh, yeah. It is. Uh, but having one talk that goes on 00:02:20.107,00:02:23.510 for 45 minutes it kinda gets a lot of set-up a lot of like, 00:02:23.510,00:02:26.213 okay, well let's talk about ourselves, we spent five minute 00:02:26.213,00:02:29.149 now uh, let's talk about the background of this, so like we 00:02:29.149,00:02:31.952 just want to get through it - we're ADD by nature about the 00:02:31.952,00:02:34.921 stuff we want to look at so, we figured what better format than 00:02:34.921,00:02:37.424 to just kinda jump through a bunch of fun topics and do it 00:02:37.424,00:02:41.361 that way. So, first thing: Bluetooth: um, yes. We have 00:02:41.361,00:02:44.097 another bluetooth talk we've had a few bluetooth talks over the 00:02:44.097,00:02:48.135 past four days including BlackHat um, Blue Hydra was 00:02:48.135,00:02:51.204 released this week by, ah ZeroChaos and Granolocks over 00:02:51.204,00:02:55.342 at, uh, DEF CON 101 earlier, um, we've got a talk coming up about 00:02:55.342,00:02:57.377 pic, actually it's today, isn't it? >>Mmm hu >>The bluetooth 00:02:57.377,00:03:00.080 lock picking from a mile away. That's really cool I do want to 00:03:00.080,00:03:02.215 go see it actually… >> It's the best track >>... um, and then 00:03:02.215,00:03:05.919 over at BlackHat side there was a gap proxy tool and a replay, 00:03:05.919,00:03:09.790 um, tool and a kinda fun bluetooth suite. So why don't we 00:03:09.790,00:03:13.326 have another talk about bluetooth low energy? Um so, a 00:03:13.326,00:03:16.963 little backstory, uh, I like magic, I've always been 00:03:16.963,00:03:21.768 fascinated with it. Um, I always had this dream as a kid to, 00:03:21.768,00:03:24.571 start a magic bar like a themed kind of magic bar. And yes they 00:03:24.571,00:03:26.606 exist but I it was kinda my little thing of like being able 00:03:26.606,00:03:29.876 to have fun with that and there's always the basic rules 00:03:29.876,00:03:33.780 of magic. One: never reveal a secret. Two: never repeat the 00:03:33.780,00:03:37.150 same trick twice. Three: practice over and over and over. 00:03:37.150,00:03:41.121 Right? And so one and three we can get covered but how do you, 00:03:41.121,00:03:44.424 in a restaurant or some other establishment track, if you've 00:03:44.424,00:03:46.760 shown the same trick to someone over and over and over? So it 00:03:46.760,00:03:50.831 kinda got my mind going as to how can you track who someone is 00:03:50.831,00:03:53.900 in any kind of environment. So I kinda came up with this long 00:03:53.900,00:03:56.937 list of ideas of how you could, huh, track someone. You know, 00:03:56.937,00:03:58.472 can you get them out of the car on the way in with a licence 00:03:58.472,00:04:01.575 plate reader, through their electronic toll collection RFID, 00:04:01.575,00:04:04.611 through bluetooth on their car. Ah, there was a great talk two 00:04:04.611,00:04:06.947 or three years ago about how the toll systems are using bluetooth 00:04:06.947,00:04:10.150 to track cars, um, if they come by foot through, or you're in a 00:04:10.150,00:04:14.054 major metropolitan area where people aren't coming by car, um, 00:04:14.054,00:04:16.289 could you do it by facial recognition, voice recognition, 00:04:16.289,00:04:18.091 different ways through their cell phone, what do they have on 00:04:18.091,00:04:20.794 them, um credit cards - all these different fun things and 00:04:20.794,00:04:23.830 always the not so fancy ways of just asking "what is your name?" 00:04:23.830,00:04:26.733 Um, and so I kinda was thinking about like well, how do you tr-, 00:04:26.733,00:04:29.536 uh, outside of like this from that application. How do you 00:04:29.536,00:04:33.607 track someone, right? And so, it kinda came down to these three 00:04:33.607,00:04:36.877 areas of, or four areas of like well these are the key ways that 00:04:36.877,00:04:40.814 if you could get positive data that isn't all garbage um, but 00:04:40.814,00:04:44.484 wifi's a little bit of a problem uh, so, we've gone through the 00:04:44.484,00:04:47.287 wifi tracking thing for years we've talked about it, about how 00:04:47.287,00:04:49.156 the phones are probing for wifi and I'm not going to dive too 00:04:49.156,00:04:51.892 much into it but I hate to pick on Nordstroms because I love 00:04:51.892,00:04:54.327 them, but they were the ones that called out hard, Home Depo 00:04:54.327,00:04:57.564 was doing it too all of them kinda stopped this practice but, 00:04:57.564,00:05:01.101 it was a way they were tracking user behaviour by looking for 00:05:01.101,00:05:05.372 the bluetooth, uh the wifi probes from your phone. Uh, but 00:05:05.372,00:05:07.774 mobile device manufacturers caught on to this, they started 00:05:07.774,00:05:12.512 doing randomised MAC addresses and, they decided that okay, 00:05:12.512,00:05:15.515 only if you connect to a genuine SSID will I take and actually 00:05:15.515,00:05:18.819 display my real MAC. So, we kinda take it as a data point 00:05:18.819,00:05:21.855 but we don't trust it now for wifi as not all devices 00:05:21.855,00:05:24.724 randomise but most kinda do on a mobile device front now. So that 00:05:24.724,00:05:28.428 leaves us with bluetooth, car keys, RFID loyalty card. That's 00:05:28.428,00:05:32.232 kinda the key ideas I was like um, messing with in my head and 00:05:32.232,00:05:35.335 well, yeah, we could do car keys. I'm not, great on my STR 00:05:35.335,00:05:38.972 skills, I'm getting better, but uh, and the RFID loyalty card is 00:05:38.972,00:05:42.709 kinda lame so… let's talk about bluetooth. I'm not gonna spend 00:05:42.709,00:05:45.212 too much time on bluetooth 101 if you wanta learn more about 00:05:45.212,00:05:47.914 bluetooth and the stacks, there are plenty of talks about it but 00:05:47.914,00:05:50.217 for those of you who are catching up with us today um, 00:05:50.217,00:05:53.887 bluetooth classic uses one meg, one megahertz channels, has 79 00:05:53.887,00:05:57.991 of them for data, one for broadcast hops at 1600 times a 00:05:57.991,00:06:01.094 second, the MAC address - effective MAC address, the 00:06:01.094,00:06:04.397 address it uses - uses a, uh, upper address part and a lower 00:06:04.397,00:06:07.367 address part to make up the address you only get the lower 00:06:07.367,00:06:11.338 address part in the packets, um and we all know about this and 00:06:11.338,00:06:13.473 the only thing that's really using bluetooth now is obviously 00:06:13.473,00:06:18.078 audio devices um, head-, headphones, bluetooth earpieces 00:06:18.078,00:06:20.947 that kind of stuff but we've kinda moved to the bluetooth low 00:06:20.947,00:06:25.452 energy or as bluetooth likes to call it bluetooth smart [sigh] 00:06:25.452,00:06:29.022 smart. Um, and we've talked a lot about the insecurity in the 00:06:29.022,00:06:32.359 past in other talks. There's 36 channels, they are 2 megahertz 00:06:32.359,00:06:35.762 wide for data, 3 announcement channels and then the increment 00:06:35.762,00:06:38.832 of rotation of those channels and the interval all that is 00:06:38.832,00:06:41.701 dictated when it does the join to the master and what you get 00:06:41.701,00:06:44.738 basically is you have a six byte address effectively a MAC, we'll 00:06:44.738,00:06:48.875 call it for sake of everyone. Um, that's used to do an, the 00:06:48.875,00:06:51.978 advertisement and then what actually connects is a four byte 00:06:51.978,00:06:54.748 access address that is actually used to communicate for that 00:06:54.748,00:07:00.587 session. Everyone with me so far? I know it's early but I 00:07:00.587,00:07:03.189 don't want to waste too much time on bluetooth, so bluetooth 00:07:03.189,00:07:05.191 does have security through, when we talk about the wifi 00:07:05.191,00:07:09.029 randomisation um, the bluetooth group actually started that 00:07:09.029,00:07:13.033 randomisation also for it's, it's addresses in bluetooth 00:07:13.033,00:07:15.669 smart uh, and actually this is the funny thing they actually 00:07:15.669,00:07:17.704 have an ad up on their site or not an ad, a blog post on their 00:07:17.704,00:07:20.540 site about protecting your privacy with bluetooth we've got 00:07:20.540,00:07:22.942 good stuff and they use this photo of this child walking 00:07:22.942,00:07:26.346 alone, the biggest FUD I've seen in a long time of scaring you of 00:07:26.346,00:07:33.119 like my kid's being tracked, oh my god. [theatrical sigh] So, 00:07:33.119,00:07:34.854 like I said there's the access address, right, that's what's 00:07:34.854,00:07:37.490 actually used in those data packets um but they change upon 00:07:37.490,00:07:39.626 the disconnect and reconnect every time a device a device is 00:07:39.626,00:07:42.562 connecting, except for in the advertisement which is static. 00:07:42.562,00:07:45.198 Um, so long term tracking of these access addresses isn't so 00:07:45.198,00:07:47.901 reliable uh, obviously with devices connecting for a long 00:07:47.901,00:07:51.338 time you can track some behaviour, moving throughout for 00:07:51.338,00:07:53.840 an hour, two hours but if there's any kind of disconnect 00:07:53.840,00:07:57.043 out of activity they'll regenerate. So it'll give to you 00:07:57.043,00:08:00.146 good short term tracking but from a long term perspective you 00:08:00.146,00:08:03.616 can't really track someone with those access addresses. So it 00:08:03.616,00:08:06.753 got me thinking so we, we've got randomised addresses on that 00:08:06.753,00:08:09.055 side, we've got randomised addresses on the access 00:08:09.055,00:08:11.958 [08:08]er and or advertisements in the access. So, what else is 00:08:11.958,00:08:15.228 there? So, when it comes to bluetooth it's two different 00:08:15.228,00:08:18.164 kind of profiles. There's the generic access profile, GAP, and 00:08:18.164,00:08:22.669 the generic attribute profile, GAT. Um, I'm not going to dive 00:08:22.669,00:08:25.238 too much into these because, obviously this is not a 101 00:08:25.238,00:08:28.842 talk. Um, but basically the GAP and GAP profile provide the 00:08:28.842,00:08:31.144 communications standard for communicating to the device. 00:08:31.144,00:08:33.913 They basically set up the connect and communicate with the 00:08:33.913,00:08:38.752 services that the device-, the slave has. So, I started looking 00:08:38.752,00:08:40.920 at these devices to see what could be tested and obviously 00:08:40.920,00:08:42.589 you go around, you play with the tools, you're like "okay, 00:08:42.589,00:08:48.128 nothin, nothin, nothin" - I travel a lot. Um, a- a lot! So 00:08:48.128,00:08:51.731 [laugh] I notice, when I was on planes, that all of a sudden, a 00:08:51.731,00:08:56.803 lot of devices started showing up. That's odd. Umm, so normally 00:08:56.803,00:08:58.938 walking around you saw a few devices and we generally didn't 00:08:58.938,00:09:01.007 know what the behaviour of all these devices we. We saw certain 00:09:01.007,00:09:04.344 Fitbits and that kind of stuff. But wha- what's the deal? It 00:09:04.344,00:09:07.814 turns out that, certain devices, when they are disconnected from 00:09:07.814,00:09:11.184 their phones - or whatever they are paired to - they jump back 00:09:11.184,00:09:14.888 into advertisement mode. So, uh, for your simple coding pleasure. 00:09:14.888,00:09:18.958 If it's not paired it goes into advertisement mode. And again 00:09:18.958,00:09:20.794 this is unique behaviour we started determining with some of 00:09:20.794,00:09:24.931 these devices. So, can we get devices to disconnect and 00:09:24.931,00:09:28.435 actually take and start broadcasting again? Uh, uh the 00:09:28.435,00:09:31.971 answer is, uh yeah. We can. Uh, it's interesting that you can 00:09:31.971,00:09:35.809 actually jam the 2 point 4 gigahertz range with, uuum, some 00:09:35.809,00:09:40.447 success. Right? Uh, basically the- using the USRB- P- 00:09:40.447,00:09:44.184 U.S.R.P.B 2- 210, uh you have about 56 megabits of bandwidth. 00:09:44.184,00:09:47.086 Uh, it's not reliable, especially it takes a lot to 00:09:47.086,00:09:50.290 drive it, but you can basically effectively create a 2 point 4 00:09:50.290,00:09:53.827 gigahertz jammer using a SDR, uh by generating some random data 00:09:53.827,00:09:56.830 noise. We did all this and we testing it and we noticed by 00:09:56.830,00:10:01.267 jamming the 2 [laugh] those frequency bands of 200- 2428 00:10:01.267,00:10:05.071 megahertz to 2478 megahertz - so basically that's 56- 50 00:10:05.071,00:10:09.075 megahertz band… we can actually take and get the devices to fall 00:10:09.075,00:10:13.179 off and jump back to their advertisement channels. Uh but 00:10:13.179,00:10:15.648 obviously this depends on the host. I have to give credit to 00:10:15.648,00:10:18.485 IOS. They have great frequency hopping and detection. So 00:10:18.485,00:10:20.620 basically the phone detects "okay I see a lot of jamming, 00:10:20.620,00:10:24.023 I'm going to move to this frequency band and re-pair" So 00:10:24.023,00:10:28.061 it does have some reliability but it's a little odd. The other 00:10:28.061,00:10:31.331 way to get a disconnect is by blasting terminate connection 00:10:31.331,00:10:34.400 packets. This is basically, effectively the bluetooth 00:10:34.400,00:10:37.437 version of de-auth. Is you look for the access address and then 00:10:37.437,00:10:40.273 you spoof a disconnect and it terminates. Now, granted, again, 00:10:40.273,00:10:44.077 limited window and it gets wonky with some devices ah, we noticed 00:10:44.077,00:10:46.146 some devices don't like to rejoin after they've been told 00:10:46.146,00:10:48.548 to disconnect. So it's one of those things that if you are 00:10:48.548,00:10:50.717 trying to track someone it kinda gets you some good opportunity 00:10:50.717,00:10:52.986 to get an ID from them and get the connection advertisement 00:10:52.986,00:10:57.257 side but not so much that it's not going to be noticed. So 00:10:57.257,00:10:59.959 we've all talked about tracking before, right? So why am I 00:10:59.959,00:11:02.328 rambling about tracking, tracking, tracking? Well, a lot 00:11:02.328,00:11:05.198 of the talk before has been to- about "well it's possible". 00:11:05.198,00:11:08.568 Okay, well, s- with who, with what, you know? This is really 00:11:08.568,00:11:12.505 more of an implementation issue. Um, this is- when it comes down 00:11:12.505,00:11:14.407 to individual devices implementing it - especially in 00:11:14.407,00:11:18.745 the consumer side - what does what? Amazon, Best Buy probably 00:11:18.745,00:11:22.181 loves me by now because I just bought a crap-ton of bluetooth. 00:11:22.181,00:11:24.384 low-energy devices that people use every day. Um, and we're 00:11:24.384,00:11:26.819 gonna go through th- a few of them and step: what we tested 00:11:26.819,00:11:29.188 and basically we did a consumer-report style testing 00:11:29.188,00:11:31.891 against them to see what privacy information are they actually 00:11:31.891,00:11:36.896 leaking. And we'll start with the worst. Sorry - need water. 00:11:43.603,00:11:45.572 These guys were on Shark Tank a while back and you may have 00:11:45.572,00:11:47.941 heard em because it's kind of a funny idea of shocking yourself 00:11:47.941,00:11:52.145 every time you do something bad. [laughter] It's also a fun thing 00:11:52.145,00:11:53.913 to shock your friends when they do something bad and they're 00:11:53.913,00:11:56.749 like" I'm trying to learn.. [inaudible] Stop it!". But 00:11:56.749,00:12:01.020 basically they use a static MAC address. The MAC address- the 00:12:01.020,00:12:06.025 last four, sorry, 8 bits? 8 bits. 16 bits? 16 bits! Sorry, 00:12:08.761,00:12:12.298 Math is hard. The last 16 bits of the MAC is in the SSI- or in 00:12:12.298,00:12:16.636 the name of the device. Correct me on my math. Um, and if you 00:12:16.636,00:12:19.038 don't happen to have the- the MAC address from the stack MAC 00:12:19.038,00:12:22.241 address or uh, its' name, send a GAP request to it and it gives 00:12:22.241,00:12:28.147 it to you [laughter] in ASCII to hex. I do- du- ah. Somebody 00:12:28.147,00:12:31.050 wrote a BAT converter on that. So, this is super easy to track 00:12:31.050,00:12:33.519 because we have a static address, never rotates. But like 00:12:33.519,00:12:36.589 I said, they've started implementing this rotation in 00:12:36.589,00:12:40.727 bluetooth uh smart. That devices are started taking eh, advantage 00:12:40.727,00:12:43.830 of. But then we have these devices that are meant to track 00:12:43.830,00:12:47.533 you: um, Tracker and Tile. We'll talk about Tile next but 00:12:47.533,00:12:50.303 effectively these addresses they show up in the broadcast address 00:12:50.303,00:12:53.039 as being random uh, and they do generate a random one because 00:12:53.039,00:12:54.641 the ID's rotate through it. But. the ID actually never really 00:12:54.641,00:12:58.411 rotates on it,. Uh the MAC address we've noticed over a 00:12:58.411,00:13:02.548 period of over four months they never rotate it. They did they 00:13:02.548,00:13:06.119 did but they never rotate it, so effectively seems as if when the 00:13:06.119,00:13:08.721 device powers on it generate an new one but if it never powers 00:13:08.721,00:13:11.257 off it never rotates after that. As well as with these device 00:13:11.257,00:13:15.294 meant to track you - as community meant to track you so, 00:13:15.294,00:13:17.930 ir-regardless of the MAC address there use a static ID associate 00:13:17.930,00:13:21.200 in the GAP profile that will take and actually dis- display, 00:13:21.200,00:13:23.903 in the case of the tracker, the raw MAC address of the device. 00:13:23.903,00:13:27.306 And it constantly broadcasts when it's disconnected… Tile's 00:13:27.306,00:13:28.675 the same way, um, the Tile identifier in GAT is one of the 00:13:28.675,00:13:30.009 services in there, uh again - static MAC addresses again 00:13:30.009,00:13:31.344 because it does randomise but never rotates, randomisers on 00:13:31.344,00:13:32.679 boot and it stays connected to a device but only while the Tile 00:13:32.679,00:13:37.684 app on a phone is open but once you close the Tile app it 00:13:42.321,00:13:47.326 disconnects. [sigh] Our friends over at Fitbit, the Fitbit one 00:13:49.896,00:13:52.565 also uses a random MAC address but after about four months we 00:13:52.565,00:13:55.968 didn't re- notice it rotate at all. It doesn't rain- remain 00:13:55.968,00:13:58.805 connected to a mobile device at all. So basically to save energy 00:13:58.805,00:14:00.573 it only connects when you connect to it and say "hey, how 00:14:00.573,00:14:03.876 many steps do I have? What's my, my time" all that stuff. But it 00:14:03.876,00:14:06.212 doesn't remain connected so it's constantly broadcasting as well. 00:14:06.212,00:14:10.583 So thing have started to get better after this. A little bit. 00:14:10.583,00:14:14.153 With the Withins Active, another device we tested, the MAC 00:14:14.153,00:14:18.491 address randomises. But it still advertises the raw MAC address 00:14:18.491,00:14:22.028 in the advertisement data which broadcasts out. So while the MAC 00:14:22.028,00:14:24.330 address is changing it's advertising its' real MAC 00:14:24.330,00:14:29.135 address inside the manufacturer data. Um, okay? That's a 00:14:29.135,00:14:33.706 security choice. >>[laughter] >>Then the Pebble Steel also 00:14:33.706,00:14:36.509 uses a- another way we can track the devices is in thier name and 00:14:36.509,00:14:38.945 we've talked about this before too but has in the name, the 00:14:38.945,00:14:44.050 last - four digits (I'm done doing math) um, of the ha, MAC 00:14:44.050,00:14:46.686 address and it's random but still after days of rebooting 00:14:46.686,00:14:50.056 the device and turning it on and off and losing power it still 00:14:50.056,00:14:54.927 kept the same, static address. Uh, but advertising as random. 00:14:54.927,00:14:57.897 Again in the device info and GAP profile it's got the serial 00:14:57.897,00:15:00.099 number of the device and it goes to sleep every once in awhile so 00:15:00.099,00:15:03.202 it;s not really reliable but it's a cool choice it also used 00:15:03.202,00:15:06.773 "classic" so we can track its' lower address too. So, 00:15:06.773,00:15:10.443 interesting choices on how it connects. The Fitbit Alta the 00:15:10.443,00:15:13.179 MAC address randomises but, again, like all the other ones 00:15:13.179,00:15:19.485 they stay static for our months, even after battery loss. Um, 00:15:19.485,00:15:22.622 getting a little bit better this one doesn't turn bluetooth on 00:15:22.622,00:15:27.160 until you actually turn it on to sync mode. [sigh] This one has 00:15:27.160,00:15:29.328 the the name- uh the Microsoft band has the name of the address 00:15:29.328,00:15:32.298 inside of the device name and it does randomise the MAC. So we're 00:15:32.298,00:15:34.200 halfway there. We got a name that's kind of static, that's 00:15:34.200,00:15:38.271 what you set it for but the addresses are rotingatin so… And 00:15:38.271,00:15:39.839 then on the better side of things of people who actually 00:15:39.839,00:15:42.842 implement security well, we gotta give credit to Apple they 00:15:42.842,00:15:47.847 rotate their MACs pretty well. Androidware um, this was on sale 00:15:47.847,00:15:53.152 thank you Amazon Prime day yeah… um but also notice that 00:15:53.152,00:15:55.855 this is really cool on the uh Androidware watches. Once it's 00:15:55.855,00:15:59.458 connected it stops responding to broadcasts forever… uh basically 00:15:59.458,00:16:01.861 it'll still randomise, it'll connect to the device it knows 00:16:01.861,00:16:05.031 but unless you go into the watch to say "let me reconnect" it 00:16:05.031,00:16:07.233 doesn't respond to broadcasts anymore. So wha- I have to give 00:16:07.233,00:16:09.902 kudos to them because that the best we saw of all the things. 00:16:11.938,00:16:14.874 IOS devices as well like to broadcast bluetooth low-energy 00:16:14.874,00:16:18.744 noise uh, they do randomised through and advertise they are 00:16:18.744,00:16:21.180 an iPhone, iPad etc, but that MAC address randomised 00:16:21.180,00:16:24.784 consistently so while it's being used in [laugh] fun apps, 00:16:24.784,00:16:28.154 including Safari, we noticed, um… take that one on for size 00:16:28.154,00:16:32.191 and think about that… it does randomised quickly and randomly 00:16:32.191,00:16:34.727 so there's not and trackability on the actual iOS devices , we 00:16:34.727,00:16:36.863 noticed. So we have to give kudos to these three for doing 00:16:36.863,00:16:38.698 it right, the rest we kinda went through quick because we're 00:16:38.698,00:16:42.001 doing it consumer report style and what we were gonna do is we 00:16:42.001,00:16:44.103 were gonna release a tool with this to kinda track all these 00:16:44.103,00:16:49.842 things. Fuck you Zerocast, he kinda beat us to the punch and 00:16:49.842,00:16:52.912 got a better tool out so I just said: " No, bravo, we- we'll 00:16:52.912,00:16:57.016 just do it on that side and point over there because…" 00:16:57.016,00:16:59.118 [sigh] they did a great job on that. So the Pony- uh Pony 00:16:59.118,00:17:02.755 Express crew released this ouh… was it Thursday at 101? >>Yes 00:17:02.755,00:17:04.557 >>I think probably posted it three days before then, four 00:17:04.557,00:17:07.326 days before then so, um this is definately a great tool to look 00:17:07.326,00:17:09.695 at for tracking those things. It doesn't, I don't think it 00:17:09.695,00:17:12.732 supports GAT yet, but I'm sure it will soon, if I have a few 00:17:12.732,00:17:15.368 more minutes to tweak some code. So where do we go from here with 00:17:15.368,00:17:18.004 all these devices? We complain about them all and I spend 15 00:17:18.004,00:17:20.873 minutes rambling about this Um, we really need to start testing 00:17:20.873,00:17:22.642 more of these devices to determine what s the 00:17:22.642,00:17:24.510 implementation issues with them instead of just like "well it's 00:17:24.510,00:17:27.680 a problem". With these new IOT things it's obviously a problem 00:17:27.680,00:17:30.249 across the space and we all can complain about IOT this and iot 00:17:30.249,00:17:34.086 that, um so we're throwing up oh, I forgot to actually commit 00:17:34.086,00:17:36.422 this this morning ah [laugh] throwing up on Github uh, 00:17:36.422,00:17:38.291 basically a repository that everyone can submit pull 00:17:38.291,00:17:41.527 requests to that as you test a device and say "hey I looked at 00:17:41.527,00:17:44.330 this and it does this, this, this behavior" and we'll have a 00:17:44.330,00:17:46.999 little checklist of things that we are looking for EWe can all 00:17:46.999,00:17:50.069 kinda source together as to: " hey, here's how this specific 00:17:50.069,00:17:53.372 device behaves here's a checkability of this device" not 00:17:53.372,00:17:56.008 that it's possible not tha- to fool people with FUD, FUD, FUD, 00:17:56.008,00:17:59.745 but that it's actually possible or uh, that it's possible for 00:17:59.745,00:18:03.783 this device, this implementation. Long story short 00:18:03.783,00:18:06.552 when MAC addresses are random look for things that aren't 00:18:06.552,00:18:08.821 involved in the MAC, which include; not actually 00:18:08.821,00:18:13.292 randomising them, the, uh GATs leaking serials and the device 00:18:13.292,00:18:16.862 names you can knock a device off bluetooth, uh, by using either 00:18:16.862,00:18:19.231 the deauth packets or by actually broadcasting on the 2 00:18:19.231,00:18:23.903 point 4 gigahertz a lot of noise. Um, certain frequencies. 00:18:23.903,00:18:26.072 And when the standard, while the standard of bluetooth is great, 00:18:26.072,00:18:28.407 supports a lot of cool stuff, uh, these devices aren't 00:18:28.407,00:18:31.344 implementing it. Alright I'm going to switch it on the Erin 00:18:31.344,00:18:35.648 who's going to talk more about the home security side. 00:18:35.648,00:18:38.351 >>Alright this is the squirrel part of our talk. [applause] 00:18:38.351,00:18:41.187 Squirrel [applause] Oh he’s not done, he has to get back up 00:18:41.187,00:18:43.623 again don’t you guys don’t do that to him. [laughter] Just 00:18:43.623,00:18:46.692 give him a minute. [inaudible talking] right ya right you’re 00:18:46.692,00:18:50.896 gonna ya don’t don’t feed the ego. Not yet. Later, later. 00:18:50.896,00:18:53.633 [laughs] Alright so we’re gonna talk a little bit about consumer 00:18:53.633,00:18:59.405 wireless camera and office security. So before we get into 00:18:59.405,00:19:02.508 this we’ve had lots of talks about uh wireless CCTV all this 00:19:02.508,00:19:04.777 kind of stuff so let’s uh chat about what we’re not gonna talk 00:19:04.777,00:19:07.980 about. We are not gonna talk about weaker default passwords. 00:19:07.980,00:19:11.484 You guys have Google you can use it yes everybody with the 00:19:11.484,00:19:14.587 exception of maybe 10 percent of people still use all of these 00:19:14.587,00:19:19.525 congratulations. We're also not gonna talk about IP weaknesses 00:19:19.525,00:19:23.095 but if you wanna make your uh network even more insecure, this 00:19:23.095,00:19:26.298 guy on Youtube can actually help ya out and tell you exactly how 00:19:26.298,00:19:28.634 to route it to the external internet if you really want to. 00:19:28.634,00:19:33.239 Good times. I mean it was helpful it was his intent. We’re 00:19:33.239,00:19:37.176 also not gonna talk about deauthing 101 um everybody has 00:19:37.176,00:19:41.113 Google download Calle use some Google fill and you can figure 00:19:41.113,00:19:44.483 out yourself how to buy the cards that’ll work and deauth it 00:19:44.483,00:19:48.487 yourself so. >>Hint! >>Hint. [laughter] Also we’re not gonna 00:19:48.487,00:19:52.892 talk about Showden. It’s awesome not this talk though. Go have 00:19:52.892,00:19:55.227 fun with it and I wanted to put a slide up and say we’re also 00:19:55.227,00:19:57.830 not gonna talk about Pokemon Go cause it’s almost as fun as 00:19:57.830,00:20:03.502 Showden but [inhales deeply] So uh so who cares about the CCTV 00:20:03.502,00:20:07.940 cameras and the security. Well ya know what? It grinds my 00:20:07.940,00:20:12.745 gears, I care because these camera companies are selling it 00:20:12.745,00:20:17.216 as security devices. Not all of em most of em are selling 00:20:17.216,00:20:23.456 security. [clears throat] So that got me to thinking, ya 00:20:23.456,00:20:29.328 know, what if? What if these were used as security devices. 00:20:29.328,00:20:32.098 Well I wanna be a bad guy and for anybody that knows me knows 00:20:32.098,00:20:35.234 that I have a little problem when it comes to automobiles. I 00:20:35.234,00:20:40.906 like them a lot. >>[laughs] >>So uh so step 1 in my little mental 00:20:40.906,00:20:43.542 process when I was thinking about these cameras was was 00:20:43.542,00:20:46.645 kinda getting into the mood. So I wanted to channel my inner 00:20:46.645,00:20:53.052 sway and think about hmm if I had this this absolutely amazing 00:20:53.052,00:20:56.088 warehouse full of Ferrari’s that was protected by these security 00:20:56.088,00:21:02.495 cameras what would I do? This also plays into homes and stuff 00:21:02.495,00:21:05.064 but I find Ferrari’s to be a lot more fun than thinking about the 00:21:05.064,00:21:08.501 homes right now. So the first thing I would do, get into the 00:21:08.501,00:21:12.271 mood. Second thing I would do, I’d get some information. 00:21:12.271,00:21:15.441 Information’s are pretty easy to find. Especially you know we 00:21:15.441,00:21:18.611 have this technology here I’m gonna use that really loosely 00:21:18.611,00:21:20.212 everyone in this conference we’ve been talking about war 00:21:20.212,00:21:25.684 driving for freakin years decade almo wow decades wow that’s old 00:21:25.684,00:21:28.721 anyway. >>That’s old >>It’s old. So some people call it war 00:21:28.721,00:21:30.756 driving, in this case we’re gonna call it target 00:21:30.756,00:21:35.427 identification. So with that you can drive around because these 00:21:35.427,00:21:38.130 devices are lovely and like to tell you who they are all the 00:21:38.130,00:21:41.267 time and in their MAC addresses you can actually tell who 00:21:41.267,00:21:44.236 they’re from. So you can go on to the ni the nice little 00:21:44.236,00:21:47.773 Google’s help us out again and identify who exactly these 00:21:47.773,00:21:51.043 cameras belong to or you can actually just look for the cu 00:21:51.043,00:21:53.145 cute little stickers that come with the cameras that say hey 00:21:53.145,00:21:56.715 you’re on camera and some of em even have the brand name on em 00:21:56.715,00:22:02.254 even easier. So with that I’m thinking about where the attack 00:22:02.254,00:22:06.292 goes. So obviously we’ve had many talks that have talked 00:22:06.292,00:22:10.462 about um wireless deauthing and what not. So let’s take that a 00:22:10.462,00:22:14.500 little bit of a step further. This talk was kind of composed 00:22:14.500,00:22:17.670 with the idea that let’s find out what these cameras actually 00:22:17.670,00:22:22.007 do. Let’s find out what happens when they get deauthed. Let’s 00:22:22.007,00:22:27.012 find out do they notify? Do they recover? So in the attack we’re 00:22:29.315,00:22:32.551 gonna be thinking about the fact of how long it would take an 00:22:32.551,00:22:37.656 intruder to get into a facility, a building, a house, what not, 00:22:37.656,00:22:40.759 what they would have to do ahead of it, how long they would have 00:22:40.759,00:22:44.129 to deauth the cameras and, could they make it away clean so to 00:22:44.129,00:22:48.133 speak. So that being said ya know we’re not gonna talk about 00:22:48.133,00:22:50.736 point a entry and what not like Zack said earlier there’s a 00:22:50.736,00:22:54.106 wonderful uh bluetooth lock talk and so I’m assuming some of 00:22:54.106,00:22:56.208 these homes that have these lovely uh camera systems also 00:22:56.208,00:22:58.210 have the bluetooth locks and we can do a whole bunch of fun 00:22:58.210,00:23:03.148 things with that as well. So, the attack. So in the attack 00:23:06.352,00:23:09.622 we’re gonna talk about which cameras are weak. So in order to 00:23:09.622,00:23:11.991 do that, we had to just like Zack, go and buy a whole bunch a 00:23:11.991,00:23:16.395 cameras but ya know since we this is Defcon and ya know we’re 00:23:16.395,00:23:19.932 progressive these years, I wanted to make sure that we had 00:23:19.932,00:23:25.204 diversity. >>[laughs] >>So we have lots of different cameras 00:23:25.204,00:23:29.742 that we tested. Lots and lots of them from different manufactures 00:23:29.742,00:23:35.547 of different sizes. So we went from the big guys to small guys 00:23:35.547,00:23:39.318 that's them so which one of them are not saying they’re a 00:23:39.318,00:23:42.254 security camera was my question I showed you guys earlier all 00:23:42.254,00:23:47.626 the articles and what not. So how many actually uh say they do 00:23:47.626,00:23:52.631 security? All but 2. >>[laughs] >>So there are 2 really, really 00:23:55.634,00:23:58.137 I’ll say forth coming companies that don’t claim to be security 00:23:58.137,00:24:01.373 cameras they’re just like hey were this, this is what we are 00:24:01.373,00:24:06.779 good for them. So what was tested? So we did a little bit 00:24:06.779,00:24:08.781 of everything. So obviously we wanted to know what the offline 00:24:08.781,00:24:10.716 time was, we wanted to know if it does any kind of 00:24:10.716,00:24:13.185 notifications. So if you get bumped offline, network 00:24:13.185,00:24:16.655 interference what not what’s the threshold of notifications. Is 00:24:16.655,00:24:19.792 there any type of cache video on the device? So if it’s knocked 00:24:19.792,00:24:22.261 off how you know what what amounts gonna actually store 00:24:22.261,00:24:25.731 locally before we have to recover? What if there’s any 00:24:25.731,00:24:29.935 type of wired network options, if there’s any type of SD 00:24:29.935,00:24:33.939 options on the device itself for local storage? Type of power 00:24:33.939,00:24:36.608 kinda was curious whether it was battery or wired obviously its 00:24:36.608,00:24:39.511 points of failure there. Additional equipment needed for 00:24:39.511,00:24:42.448 the function of cameras, it’s not all of them are just stick 00:24:42.448,00:24:46.685 up and any other performance obfer servations. So because we 00:24:46.685,00:24:48.754 were actually being pretty pragmatic about how this was 00:24:48.754,00:24:52.257 done we actually had a test procedure. So ya know at 0 00:24:52.257,00:24:55.227 stopwatch starts at about a minute in we did a targeted 00:24:55.227,00:24:58.464 deauth attack. About every 30 seconds we were waving our hands 00:24:58.464,00:25:00.532 for motion recognition cause some of the cameras did we 00:25:00.532,00:25:04.770 required it and about 10 minutes into the attack we did the 00:25:04.770,00:25:07.306 targeted deauth ending. So we terminated it and we gave it 00:25:07.306,00:25:10.309 about 5 minutes from there to see when it would come back 00:25:10.309,00:25:15.748 online on the network. So this is my high tech setup. It’s 00:25:15.748,00:25:20.386 pretty impressive. So we have the uh the timer, whatever 00:25:20.386,00:25:23.889 cameras being tested at the time, the ipad with the camera 00:25:23.889,00:25:26.425 app so we could vis actually visually see what was going on 00:25:26.425,00:25:29.228 with the camera. When it was gonna recover and obviously a 00:25:29.228,00:25:34.099 whole bunch of uh area play fun going on right there. So that 00:25:34.099,00:25:37.002 being said, I like to always prove my work like in my good 00:25:37.002,00:25:41.607 ol’ math classes. >>And live demos never work so. >>And live 00:25:41.607,00:25:44.476 demos never work so for you guys, I want you to know I spent 00:25:44.476,00:25:48.080 many a weekends with my GoPro taping these lovely things but I 00:25:48.080,00:25:50.516 fast forwarded em for you. So this is your drink break, anyone 00:25:50.516,00:25:53.819 who has coffee or anything have a nice drink, take a second. 00:25:53.819,00:25:58.824 >>Aaah >>Ya there’s about like 2 minutes and I fast forwarded the 00:26:03.762,00:26:09.701 crap outta these in split screen and so uh ya. You get the idea. 00:26:09.701,00:26:15.641 So now the results. Kuna >>[laughing] >>I love this 00:26:15.641,00:26:19.144 little Kuna device it was a kickstarter actually um as were 00:26:19.144,00:26:23.348 a few of these but the cute thing was the Kuna device eh it 00:26:23.348,00:26:25.984 kinda did what it said it was gonna do not quite security. Ya 00:26:25.984,00:26:29.788 know it recovered after about a minute 30 a minute 40 after the 00:26:29.788,00:26:34.193 deauth ended. The positives, it’s a light. [laughter] If the 00:26:34.193,00:26:37.796 camera doesn’t work you gotta front light yay! [laughter] 00:26:37.796,00:26:39.698 Another positive it’s wired there’s no way around it, 00:26:39.698,00:26:43.569 there’s no battery powered it’s it’s hard wired. Um the 00:26:43.569,00:26:47.973 negatives only if the app’s open are we getting notifications. Uh 00:26:47.973,00:26:51.043 one of the other negatives or positives, depends how you look 00:26:51.043,00:26:55.514 at it. It had this really cool uh pardon me, [clanking] the 00:26:55.514,00:26:59.384 clanking is killing me. [laughter] [thud] It had these 00:26:59.384,00:27:02.988 cool status lights at the bottom of the light. Which were super 00:27:02.988,00:27:05.958 helpful and I appreciate the developers that put em on there 00:27:05.958,00:27:08.360 because you know it’s supposed to help out the consumers to let 00:27:08.360,00:27:13.565 em know if it’s paired and what not or if it’s online. That’s 00:27:13.565,00:27:16.068 always a good one for an outside security light to have it flash 00:27:16.068,00:27:19.671 red. [laughter] So one of the things we learned from the 00:27:19.671,00:27:23.509 deauth attack is after uh 10 minutes of it being online uh 00:27:23.509,00:27:28.680 deauthed, it kinda just doesn’t recover. Uh before that if you 00:27:28.680,00:27:31.850 cut it a little bit early it’ll do the the minute 40 recovery 00:27:31.850,00:27:35.787 but you let it go longer it kinda falls over. So in the 00:27:35.787,00:27:37.689 testing you know these are consumer products we did a few 00:27:37.689,00:27:41.059 rounds of testing and found these things out. Well like I 00:27:41.059,00:27:44.730 told you about these cute little status lights I was Googling ya 00:27:44.730,00:27:46.899 know for the point of this talk and trying to see if I could 00:27:46.899,00:27:49.535 find you guys a pretty picture because I actually didn’t fly to 00:27:49.535,00:27:54.239 Vegas with the picture of the bottom of the the status lights 00:27:54.239,00:28:01.013 and I come across this. On their website they actually do tell 00:28:01.013,00:28:04.917 you, good to them, that it will fall over and not recover and 00:28:04.917,00:28:07.753 you have to re setup the wireless camera after 10 minutes 00:28:07.753,00:28:12.357 of deauth. So let’s just say hypothetically you have one of 00:28:12.357,00:28:15.827 these lights out in front of your house, you lose power for 00:28:15.827,00:28:20.933 more than 10 minutes, ya forget, your your light’s useless ya 00:28:20.933,00:28:23.702 know so. I would love to talk to someone who’s doing the IOT 00:28:23.702,00:28:27.105 monitoring of things there’s your uh your start for your 00:28:27.105,00:28:29.274 little project because these are some of the things you should be 00:28:29.274,00:28:32.678 looking for. So because of timing I’m gonna try to go 00:28:32.678,00:28:35.480 through these a little faster. The uh media has this cute 00:28:35.480,00:28:39.985 little Blink wireless HD monitoring and alarm system. The 00:28:39.985,00:28:42.154 Blink is totally cute I will give it credit that with 00:28:42.154,00:28:45.591 movement it will recover in about about 9 seconds. It does 00:28:45.591,00:28:50.228 have a onboard about 10, 5 to 10 second video recording. Um it’s 00:28:50.228,00:28:52.464 clip based though none of this is persistant recording it’s 00:28:52.464,00:28:56.268 just clips. Uh the cute thing is it’s easy to mount, it does 00:28:56.268,00:28:59.738 continue doing the clips. Negative ya know it does require 00:28:59.738,00:29:02.641 a base station, it is battery powered, there is no option for 00:29:02.641,00:29:08.714 uh SD, there’s no wired option, it is what it is. Amcrest which 00:29:08.714,00:29:11.350 I had never heard of this until lu again let’s look at Amazon 00:29:11.350,00:29:13.118 and find out what the best selling wireless camera on 00:29:13.118,00:29:18.223 Amazon is, it’s this one I don’t know how. Anyway >>It’s cheap 00:29:18.223,00:29:22.194 >>It is cheap, it is cheap but, you would think that maybe nest 00:29:22.194,00:29:25.397 would >>[inaudible words] >>Anyway uh so recovery’s in 2 00:29:25.397,00:29:28.166 minutes not a bad little camera. It keeps about 10 seconds 00:29:28.166,00:29:31.269 onboard storage that does have a wired option for wirele for 00:29:31.269,00:29:36.675 wired network not wired power um it does have wired power and 00:29:36.675,00:29:39.177 there is an on off switch on the unit. Not overall a bad camera 00:29:41.747,00:29:44.282 [inaudible crowd voice] [clap] Somebody like that? [laughter] 00:29:44.282,00:29:47.853 Yay Amcrest! Anyway D Link [sigh] we love D Link just for 00:29:47.853,00:29:49.688 the purpose that they don’t actually claim to be a security 00:29:49.688,00:29:53.358 camera. They’re like hey we’re a netcam we’re cool like that. I’m 00:29:53.358,00:29:56.795 like alright so on the positive it does have an SD option. 00:29:56.795,00:29:59.431 Negative there’s uh there’s no actual wired option for the 00:29:59.431,00:30:03.835 camera itself. It recovers after about a minute after the deauth. 00:30:03.835,00:30:07.372 No movement’s required for that one actually. So Netgear cute 00:30:07.372,00:30:11.309 little Arlo’s. I love these Arlo’s. They recover after about 00:30:11.309,00:30:14.279 45 seconds, they’re versatile cause they have a cute little 00:30:14.279,00:30:19.317 magnet that’s how they attach and they have a sticker. So 00:30:19.317,00:30:23.555 remember to the war driving [laughs] plea ya put no no let’s 00:30:23.555,00:30:26.124 not put the sticker up and say it’s not even bad that it’s a 00:30:26.124,00:30:28.994 sticker it actually just tells you what it is. So you have a 00:30:28.994,00:30:31.730 few options when it comes to my little putting on my sunglasses 00:30:31.730,00:30:35.600 and being sway and breaking into my little Ferrari warehouse for 00:30:35.600,00:30:40.138 these. These are great I can just gr deauth it, go grab em 00:30:40.138,00:30:44.643 all put em in my bag, throw it in the Ferrari and drive out. So 00:30:44.643,00:30:46.978 so again it requires a base station, it is battery powered, 00:30:46.978,00:30:50.582 there’s no SD or onboard storage, again no actual wired 00:30:50.582,00:30:52.918 option for the camera itself because again pops on a little 00:30:52.918,00:30:57.322 magnet battery powered. Here we’re getting into the fun ones. 00:30:57.322,00:31:01.460 So the Logitech the Logi Circle oh sorry. >>No no we’ve got 00:31:01.460,00:31:05.097 we’ve got >>Alright we gotta run >>15 minutes >>I never thought 00:31:05.097,00:31:06.898 that okay well anyway >>[inaudible words] [laughs] 00:31:06.898,00:31:09.601 >>Alright ADD theatre here. Logi Circle, Logi Circle recovers in 00:31:09.601,00:31:14.272 about a minute 30 um it does do some uh constant push 00:31:14.272,00:31:17.309 notifications. Negatives has on off switch on the unit again 00:31:17.309,00:31:20.512 magnet, can grab it throw in my bag in the Ferrari outta here. 00:31:20.512,00:31:24.916 No SD or onboard storage, no wired option. Belkin, my little 00:31:24.916,00:31:28.620 buddy I’m gonna give you like one more second he recovers 00:31:28.620,00:31:32.157 after I call it the negative 10 seconds cause it does have an 00:31:32.157,00:31:34.326 onboard buffer. So the nice thing is it does come back 00:31:34.326,00:31:37.062 pretty quick so the onboard memory does recover it I dunno 00:31:37.062,00:31:39.131 if that was intentionally or network inter interference based 00:31:39.131,00:31:41.500 because they don’t actually tell you on their website in 00:31:41.500,00:31:44.503 marketing that they do that at all. They also don’t tell you 00:31:44.503,00:31:47.839 that they’re a security camera either yay Belkin. Um there’s an 00:31:47.839,00:31:50.709 on off switch on the unit and we did find inconsistent push 00:31:50.709,00:31:53.779 notifications through the app so that doesn’t help you too much. 00:31:53.779,00:31:58.049 Samsung recovers up to 10 seconds if there’s immediate 00:31:58.049,00:32:02.053 movement. Downside to that one not immediate movement eh until 00:32:02.053,00:32:05.857 the cat walks through. So positive SD option there is a 00:32:05.857,00:32:08.693 wired option to it. Uh the kinda negative is they’re kinda 00:32:08.693,00:32:12.197 working out their cloud option. There isn’t one at there wasn’t 00:32:12.197,00:32:15.267 one for our camera there was for other cameras and so that’s 00:32:15.267,00:32:18.570 that’s forthcoming and the SD storage only is on downloadable 00:32:18.570,00:32:21.907 through the app download the clip to the SD directly it’s not 00:32:21.907,00:32:25.844 permanently it’s not running a constant cache. [inhales] So the 00:32:25.844,00:32:29.981 Canary all in one security device. Canary’s awesome on 00:32:29.981,00:32:32.083 their recovery if there’s immediate movement again please 00:32:32.083,00:32:34.920 have your cat running through after a burglary. [laughter] So 00:32:34.920,00:32:39.324 uh again the deauth attack there’s a qu very quick recovery 00:32:39.324,00:32:42.894 2 seconds. There is a wired option there’s notifications the 00:32:42.894,00:32:46.998 sad part to the notifications is it takes 30 minutes so it has to 00:32:46.998,00:32:51.203 be offline for 30 minutes and that’s kinda not enough uh 00:32:51.203,00:32:54.639 because the other side a that it has to be offline consistently 00:32:54.639,00:32:58.376 for 30 minutes we did try an attack where we deauthed it for 00:32:58.376,00:33:00.712 about 10 minutes brought it back deauthed it 10 minutes brought 00:33:00.712,00:33:03.448 it back you can pretty much do that for awhile. So the 00:33:03.448,00:33:08.987 negatives uh movement is re required for recovery. Nest, 00:33:08.987,00:33:14.192 nest. [laughter] not dropcam nest anyway recovers after 20 00:33:14.192,00:33:16.928 seconds uh Nest is actually pretty good I’m not gonna I’m 00:33:16.928,00:33:20.365 not gonna beat them up too bad. I I hope that we see better 00:33:20.365,00:33:25.136 things coming from them in the future. It does keep between 30, 00:33:25.136,00:33:27.706 30 seconds and 4 minutes of cache. We were finding 00:33:27.706,00:33:30.508 inconsistencies through the testing of that just because we 00:33:30.508,00:33:34.980 did everything at uh 720p but it seemed that lighting, any other 00:33:34.980,00:33:37.749 um ambient movements were causing that to change and 00:33:37.749,00:33:41.553 fluctuate. There are push notifications for activity uh 00:33:41.553,00:33:44.022 they’re pretty consistent so that’s definitely a positive. No 00:33:44.022,00:33:48.894 SD option, no wired option. So [sighs] >>[exhales] >>I know 00:33:48.894,00:33:52.564 >>[laughs] >>I’m going I’m going away so very fast >>Ya we have 00:33:52.564,00:33:56.101 10 minutes left >>Oh shoot. Uh bad guys won’t put in the effort 00:33:56.101,00:33:57.936 ya right. Bad guys are putting in the effort to do some of 00:33:57.936,00:34:00.405 these attacks. We’re not talking about it to consumers so then 00:34:00.405,00:34:03.174 what cou should consumers actually do? Uh wired’s better 00:34:03.174,00:34:05.644 than wireless, uh verify and understand the limitation of the 00:34:05.644,00:34:08.413 products like Zack said we’re trying to put together a 00:34:08.413,00:34:11.016 database so that way everybody in this room can also contribute 00:34:11.016,00:34:13.752 to what they’re finding on their own. Nobody’s talking about this 00:34:13.752,00:34:17.122 to consumers. This is our consumer disclosure to sa tell 00:34:17.122,00:34:19.491 consumers this is what you’re putting in your house to protect 00:34:19.491,00:34:22.093 yourself. Let’s be let’s be smart and understand what we’re 00:34:22.093,00:34:24.996 doing. These cameras do have unintended great uses like real 00:34:24.996,00:34:27.999 estate ye anybody selling your house in here? I feel put one a 00:34:27.999,00:34:30.502 these cameras that has the voice listen to what the potential 00:34:30.502,00:34:34.306 buyers are telling you. Anyway, I’m out I went too long. Thank 00:34:34.306,00:34:39.311 you >>Woo! [laughter] [applause] >>I have 10 minutes to do a 00:34:44.282,00:34:46.217 whole topic. Uh one thing I wanted to reiterate about Erin’s 00:34:46.217,00:34:48.253 side that I don’t think she uh really announced and made 00:34:48.253,00:34:50.655 everyone truly clear on that I thought was great. Um so all 00:34:50.655,00:34:52.991 these cameras basically you do the Wifi deauth on and they’re 00:34:52.991,00:34:55.427 offline and Erin is there any cache recordings for the 00:34:55.427,00:34:57.095 majority of these cameras or which ones have cache 00:34:57.095,00:34:58.430 recordings? >>[laughs] Very few I don’t have a mic on >>Oh her 00:34:58.430,00:34:59.764 mic’s not working she said very few sorry. Um >>Very few like 00:34:59.764,00:35:03.435 >>But Ya so like I I know that the nest camera was 30 seconds 00:35:03.435,00:35:08.673 or thir 30 seconds to 4 minutes. >>No actually 4 minutes was the 00:35:08.673,00:35:10.675 most >>4 minutes was the max so basically once you deauth these 00:35:10.675,00:35:12.677 cameras they’re offline they’re not seeing any movement they’re 00:35:12.677,00:35:15.347 not seeing anything so if you wifi deauth them guess what? You 00:35:15.347,00:35:17.482 have no recording and there’s no cache recording on most the 00:35:17.482,00:35:20.385 devices the one’s with SD card options do. So I have to talk 00:35:20.385,00:35:22.287 about Windows for consumers I have 10 minutes >>go go go 00:35:22.287,00:35:24.489 >>We’re gonna get through this fast and the teleprompter’s 00:35:24.489,00:35:26.891 gonna try to keep up with me good luck have fun. Um 00:35:26.891,00:35:28.660 [laughter] so lotta people are buying Windows devices 00:35:28.660,00:35:30.829 especially with Windows 10 these are tablets we have fun with 00:35:30.829,00:35:33.832 them. Um and we’re not gonna be talking about OEM devices with 00:35:33.832,00:35:35.900 all these custom configurations cause the duo security crew they 00:35:35.900,00:35:38.770 did a great job on that. Uh but we tell users all these things, 00:35:38.770,00:35:41.039 patch your device, install anti virus, use HTTPS, use a password 00:35:41.039,00:35:43.141 manager, watch out for suspicious downloads, uh don’t 00:35:43.141,00:35:45.276 use suspicious wifi, pick a strong password [sniff] all of 00:35:45.276,00:35:49.147 these are great things. Oh it’s gonna get faster uh >>[laughs] 00:35:49.147,00:35:52.317 [crowd laughter] >>Reading [laughs] >>[laughs] >>Sorry 00:35:52.317,00:35:55.787 gotta keep going. These are all great things we need to keep 00:35:55.787,00:35:57.422 telling users but these are things that are not gonna stop 00:35:57.422,00:35:59.624 this so back at Defcon 20 I gave this talk about anti >>slow down 00:35:59.624,00:36:01.659 >>arm relaying >>[laughs] >> I don’t have time to slow down 00:36:01.659,00:36:04.829 >>[laughs] >>I have probably 20 slides to go um back at Defcon 00:36:04.829,00:36:06.665 20 I gave this talk about anti arm relaying. You can watch it 00:36:06.665,00:36:08.466 on Youtube or all the other places that it’s up there. The 00:36:08.466,00:36:11.269 old focus was about relaying NTLM network authentication to 00:36:11.269,00:36:13.471 corporate accounts. We were focusing on corporate corporate 00:36:13.471,00:36:16.207 corporate and focusing on internal attacks. For those of 00:36:16.207,00:36:19.077 you who are just joining us today Windows uses NTLM for some 00:36:19.077,00:36:20.979 network authentication it does use Kerbusch as well but it uses 00:36:20.979,00:36:23.948 NTLM for hashings and MD4 of the password. Uh but it’s also used 00:36:23.948,00:36:25.617 for network authentication and signing of network 00:36:25.617,00:36:28.887 authentication at some points. NTLM network authentication is 2 00:36:28.887,00:36:31.690 flavors version 1, version 2 uh basically it has a client say 00:36:31.690,00:36:34.292 hey what's up do you support this? Yup here’s my challenge 00:36:34.292,00:36:38.997 and here’s the uh the hash of the hash have fun. Um [crowd 00:36:38.997,00:36:42.534 laughter] Microsoft recommends uh to switch over to Kerberos an 00:36:42.534,00:36:47.539 and describe [laughs] Love you [clapping] [crowd laughter] I I 00:36:47.539,00:36:51.342 hope that shows up in the video some how. Um and by the way 00:36:51.342,00:36:53.178 Windows auto authenticates the thing so how does Windows auto 00:36:53.178,00:36:56.448 authenticate? It [laughs] uses uh we’ve talked about Wpad 00:36:56.448,00:36:59.017 there’s now W another Wpad talk there’s been 2 other Wpad talks 00:36:59.017,00:37:01.352 about all the fun things that were there but with Wpad Windows 00:37:01.352,00:37:03.455 auto authenticates with NTLM in some things Windows 10 does this 00:37:03.455,00:37:06.191 last but Chrome still does it. Um there’s other ways to get 00:37:06.191,00:37:09.260 users to auto authenticate with things um it’s not just Wpad you 00:37:09.260,00:37:12.797 can also use injection of UNC pass into HTTP traffic if your 00:37:12.797,00:37:15.667 on out rogue access point uh certain file formats support UNC 00:37:15.667,00:37:17.936 pass and third party applications that don’t use uh 00:37:17.936,00:37:22.574 proper cores uh ya. I won’t name names. Um but for a while we 00:37:22.574,00:37:23.942 talked about this on the corporate side the corporate 00:37:23.942,00:37:25.977 side the corporate side on the internal attacks but was it 00:37:25.977,00:37:28.913 internal only? Defcon 20 talked about how to exchange web 00:37:28.913,00:37:30.515 services while also [incomprehensible words] But 00:37:30.515,00:37:32.117 this is still a huge issue. Now I’ve talked about corporate 00:37:32.117,00:37:34.419 corporate corporate we never really talk about cracking these 00:37:34.419,00:37:36.121 hashes which are possible and we’ve always said it’s possible 00:37:36.121,00:37:38.556 to crack em. We’ve never talked about the implications of em. Um 00:37:38.556,00:37:40.658 so for corporate sides we can to VPN access shared point shared 00:37:40.658,00:37:42.894 passwords all that fun stuff but what about personal users? We’re 00:37:42.894,00:37:44.696 talking about fighting for the users. Things that were gonna go 00:37:44.696,00:37:48.032 and defend against them. Um so what what if they have a shared 00:37:48.032,00:37:49.801 password for certain accounts? What if they’re broadcasting 00:37:49.801,00:37:51.669 these things? What about local file sharers? What about those 00:37:51.669,00:37:54.072 things? So we’ve talked about this for years for Windows XP, 00:37:54.072,00:37:57.275 Windows 7, then Windows 8 came along and Microsoft decided to 00:37:57.275,00:37:58.810 introduce a thing called Microsoft accounts. On my 00:37:58.810,00:38:02.046 Microsoft accounts they included logging into your Windows device 00:38:02.046,00:38:06.718 yay. I have a 1 minute demo video because demos rock. 00:38:06.718,00:38:08.720 [sighs] This is the point where I actually have to wait the full 00:38:08.720,00:38:11.956 minute. >>Zack attack >>So we launch a rogue HTTPNSMB server 00:38:11.956,00:38:15.426 in a tool called Zack attack yay. There’s [inaudible voice] 00:38:15.426,00:38:19.597 an update soon. [laughter] Um use MBN as broadcast we set the 00:38:19.597,00:38:23.134 options to broadcast to this device that has a rogue HTTPNSMB 00:38:23.134,00:38:28.139 service. Exploit we wait. This is real time by the way. Bleep! 00:38:31.943,00:38:36.214 [laughter] If you notice this is a Microsoft account with an 00:38:36.214,00:38:38.316 email at Outlook dot com address yes it’s a fake email that we 00:38:38.316,00:38:42.053 set up for this and [laughs] There goes the auth we run an 00:38:42.053,00:38:44.189 OCL hash crack crack the password we get the password of 00:38:44.189,00:38:50.128 hunter tubing. Wow no one got that. You guys are all noobs. 00:38:50.128,00:38:52.397 [crowd laughter] I love you I love you. We go ahead and go 00:38:52.397,00:38:56.701 into Microsoft dot com. This is the Microsoft account. This is 00:38:56.701,00:38:58.770 the account used to login to the machine. We log in with that 00:38:58.770,00:39:00.638 Microsoft account the password we just cracked from a network 00:39:00.638,00:39:07.612 broadcast authentication request. We copy we paste copy 00:39:07.612,00:39:11.282 and paste come on real time >>You can’t have a video demo 00:39:11.282,00:39:13.952 fail >>sign in. Come on get there I have 10 er 5 minutes 00:39:13.952,00:39:18.957 left. We’re logged in yay! So what does that mean? [laughter] 00:39:22.026,00:39:23.661 [applause] I don’t have time for applause. First off Mooby said 00:39:23.661,00:39:25.864 that I have to release an update. Uh yes Zack Attack’s 00:39:25.864,00:39:27.699 getting an update for Zacks who can’t code good and wanna learn 00:39:27.699,00:39:30.468 to do other stuff good too. Um yes I have to post that but ya 00:39:30.468,00:39:34.172 there is cool new things with web hooks and with um uh the 00:39:34.172,00:39:35.807 Microsoft accounts that we’ve added in there but yes sure 00:39:35.807,00:39:37.609 enough your Microsoft account that your losing using to login 00:39:37.609,00:39:40.011 into those machines, to log into your Windows 10 devices it’s 00:39:40.011,00:39:42.680 using your Outlook, Gmail, Hotmail all those fun emails you 00:39:42.680,00:39:45.083 use it’s actually broadcasting those across the network. So 00:39:45.083,00:39:47.118 what at a minimum it’s information disclosure of the 00:39:47.118,00:39:50.555 user information but we this is the first time offline password 00:39:50.555,00:39:53.524 attacks are valid over a network thing. Yes it’s worked on some 00:39:53.524,00:39:55.827 bad services before but never in this thing. So what happens when 00:39:55.827,00:39:57.495 you crack someone’s password? You get in their Microsoft 00:39:57.495,00:40:00.498 account what’d you actually get? You get their uh date of birth, 00:40:00.498,00:40:03.134 you get there zipcode, you get their billing information, you 00:40:03.134,00:40:05.203 get the last 4 of their credit card numbers for all the billing 00:40:05.203,00:40:07.805 things attached to their Microsoft account and yes these 00:40:07.805,00:40:10.408 things are sensitive. This is a 2012 article from this a 00:40:10.408,00:40:14.479 reporter who got completely poned um but basically someone 00:40:14.479,00:40:15.813 got ahold of one of his accounts, got the last 4 of his 00:40:15.813,00:40:18.383 credit card and used that to pay to do all his things. You also 00:40:18.383,00:40:25.223 get their search history including things well [crowd 00:40:25.223,00:40:27.225 laughter] [applause] >>[giggles] >>This is a libertarian noob who 00:40:27.225,00:40:30.161 wants to commit first degree murder. [laughter] Um [laughter] 00:40:30.161,00:40:31.863 and if you’re a heavy Microsoft user using your Microsoft 00:40:31.863,00:40:33.631 account not just on your thing but for all the things. You’ve 00:40:33.631,00:40:36.701 got your onedrive all your freakin files, your emails, 00:40:36.701,00:40:38.803 you’ve got remote file access to the systems if you have it 00:40:38.803,00:40:41.639 enabled. You’ve got wifi sense that fun thing to share 00:40:41.639,00:40:44.442 passwords if it’s enabled obviously but yes from a network 00:40:44.442,00:40:47.045 broadcast thing, from sniffing someone on the same wifi access 00:40:47.045,00:40:50.181 point. No! offline crackings not original but it’s the original 00:40:50.181,00:40:53.351 application of this. [sigh] We’ve used our offline passwords 00:40:53.351,00:40:55.420 before and but we’ve never had it to where it’s harvestable 00:40:55.420,00:40:58.856 from a LAN before. So what we’ve told users, patch your devices. 00:40:58.856,00:41:00.792 Yes it’s still important but it doesn’t matter for this. Install 00:41:00.792,00:41:03.261 anti virus yes some ha uh host intrusion detection is ubs 00:41:03.261,00:41:06.597 detect de default challenge just change it. You’re cracking it 00:41:06.597,00:41:09.000 anyways you’re not using a rainbow table. Um by default 00:41:09.000,00:41:11.869 uses NTLMV2 so it doesn’t matter. Use HTTPS only well 00:41:11.869,00:41:13.671 [inaudible word] you’re gonna hit HTP man point and Wpad 00:41:13.671,00:41:16.808 broadcast don’t care. Um user password manager helps but 00:41:16.808,00:41:19.243 doesn’t actually help if you’re cracking this helps with other 00:41:19.243,00:41:22.080 accounts. Don’t use er suspicious downloads doesn’t 00:41:22.080,00:41:24.649 apply to this whoops. Um don’t use suspicious wifi. Seriously, 00:41:24.649,00:41:28.786 we tell people this why don’t we just protect em. Pick a strong 00:41:28.786,00:41:31.222 password that doesn’t mean something. [burps] What we 00:41:31.222,00:41:33.257 should we should never tell users just use a random VPN 00:41:33.257,00:41:35.126 service cause that’s a horrible freakin idea to trust traffic 00:41:35.126,00:41:36.894 with someone else but for some reason we think that’s a good 00:41:36.894,00:41:39.397 idea to tell people. Um what we need to tell em. Pick a strong 00:41:39.397,00:41:41.632 password, enable 2 factor authentication. Yes in Microsoft 00:41:41.632,00:41:45.103 it takes over 10 steps to take and enable 2 factory 00:41:45.103,00:41:47.305 authentication including and adding device passwords to all 00:41:47.305,00:41:50.575 your devices. Oh my God it’s painful. Um >>Mm Hmm >>You need 00:41:50.575,00:41:52.577 to use unique creds per site. Yes it’s important so if someone 00:41:52.577,00:41:54.379 gets one cred they’re not in above it, and maybe avoid 00:41:54.379,00:41:56.714 Hotmail and, Outmail and all of onedrive for a little bit until 00:41:56.714,00:41:59.050 you can take and use a local account. How do we fix this? 00:41:59.050,00:42:01.886 Disable NTLM off uh ya that kinda sucks telling users how to 00:42:01.886,00:42:04.255 disable NTLM off but that's one ways to fix it. The other thing 00:42:04.255,00:42:06.791 is just don’t use a Microsoft to login into account to login into 00:42:06.791,00:42:09.227 your system use a local account instead. So TLDR gotta stock 00:42:09.227,00:42:11.162 Windows laptop, attacker on the same network, uses a Microsoft 00:42:11.162,00:42:13.498 account to login, you’re poned. Alright I have 3 minutes 00:42:13.498,00:42:15.466 starting with the issues. Uh fixing distracted devices what 00:42:15.466,00:42:18.169 we talk about with bluetooth. Can we track and monitor for 00:42:18.169,00:42:20.138 certain implementations. Wifi security cameras, you deauth em 00:42:20.138,00:42:22.607 they’re off the network, there’s no recordings and some don’t 00:42:22.607,00:42:24.809 give notifications. A few give notifications after 30 minutes 00:42:24.809,00:42:27.779 and there’s very limited caching on most devices except for the 2 00:42:27.779,00:42:29.914 we pointed out. Considering Windows laptops are constantly 00:42:29.914,00:42:31.849 giving creds for offline cracking this is the first time 00:42:31.849,00:42:33.684 we’ve seen that theirs can actually be offline cracking as 00:42:33.684,00:42:35.553 those kinda things. I wanna acknowledge these people for 00:42:35.553,00:42:38.456 doing some cool things Moobix, fuck you and end of line. 00:42:50.701,00:42:52.036 [laughter] [applause] [cheering] [laughter] 2 minutes remaining 00:42:52.036,00:42:53.504 we’re gonna go ahead and post the slide [laughs] I’ll slow 00:42:53.504,00:42:56.040 down. We’ll post the slides up there um we’re gonna go ahead 00:42:56.040,00:42:58.042 and I dunno where we could take Q and A because we’re right up 00:42:58.042,00:43:00.645 on the time. Uh we’ll we’ll see where can we do Q and A? Right 00:43:00.645,00:43:03.981 to the side, outside? >>[inaudible talking] >>We’ll go 00:43:03.981,00:43:06.584 outside >>We have 2 minutes so we’ll have to go outside. Ya uh 00:43:06.584,00:43:08.753 we’ll take it outside uh so the next track can get in here. 00:43:08.753,00:43:10.321 Thanks everyone for coming we appreciate you guys coming out 00:43:10.321,00:43:12.323 to make Defcon great again. Thanks for coming out. 00:43:14.759,00:43:18.629 [applause] [whistling] >>Wooh! [applause] >>excellent.